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War In Chechnya: 
Implications for Russian Security Policy 
Introduction and Acknowledgements 
Mikhail Tsypkin 
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School 
Over a century ago, in 1891, the great Russian historian Vassily K.liuchevsky described 
Russia: 
" ... like a heavily armed medieval knight. We shall be beaten not by those 
who would attack us, in a proper knightly fashion, from the front, but by 
him who would grab our leg from under the horse and turn us upside 
down: like a cockroach lying on its back, we would, without losing any of 
our inherent strength, powerlessly move our feet in search of firm ground. 
Power is action, not a potential; when not connected with discipline, it 
kills itself. We are the lower organisms in the international zoology: we 
keep on moving even after losing our head."1 
The war in Chechnya, a tiny (in comparison to the Russian Federation's population 
and human and material resources) ethnic homeland in the North Caucasus, has put into 
question Russia's military power and the cohesion of Russia's political system itself, and 
dramatically slowed Russia's momentum towards reform. The five chapters of this 
collection are based on papers by prominent Russian specialists on the implications of 
the Chechen war on Russia's security policy, presented at a conference held at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California on November 7 and 8, 1995. 
The Russian participants (in alphabetical order) were: 
• Dr. Vladimir Averchev, a member of the State Duma (lower house of 
parliament) from the Y ABLOKO party; 
• Dr. Sergei Arutyunov, Senior Fellow, Institute ofEthnic Studies, Russian 
Academy of Sciences; 
1 V. 0. Kliuchevksiy, "Aforizmy i mysli ob istorii," in Sochineniya v devyati 
tomakh, vol. 9 (Moscow: Mysl', 1990) pp. 363, 364. 
• Major Aleksandr Belkin (Ret.), Deputy Executive Secretary of the 
Council for Defense and Foreign Policy, a leading non-governmental 
organization; 
• Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer, Defense and Security Editor, Segodnya daily 
newspaper (Moscow); 
• Dr. Col. Vitaly Shlykov (Ret.), formerly with the General Staff, currently 
a private consultant. 
Russia's military involvement in Chechnya has lasted since the fall of 1994, and the 
public, both in Russia and the West, is still ignorant of the policy-making process that 
resulted in the decision to use military force in December 1994, ostensibly to , bring the 
rebellious Chechen Republic back under the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. 
Vladimir A verchev argues in his paper that the war in Chechnya has resulted from a 
virtual breakdown of the national security decision-making mechanisms of the Russian 
Federation. While the public and the elites are in general agreement over the Kremlin's 
ultimate goal in Chechnya- to preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian federation -
Yeltsin's administration made no effort, prior to the initiation of hostilities, to ensure a 
broad public or even elite support for use of force. 
The war in Chechnya has also demonstrated that the legislative branch has very little 
practical control over the actions of the executive branch in the area of national security. 
The p~u:'liam~,nt, although generally opposed to the war, has failed to find a legal 
foundation for stopping the hostilities. According to Averchev, "[T]he Council of 
Federation [the upper chamber of the parliament] was unable to exercise its authority to 
approve or disapprove the introduction of the emergency rule in Chechnya and hence the 
use of force inside the country because the President simply did not ask for it." The 
lower chamber, the State Duma, has failed to exercise the only practical power it has over 
the executive -the budgetary one in the case of Chechnya - because of various loopholes 
in Russia's laws on financing government operations. 
The executive branch has concentrated immense national security, decision-making 
power in its hands, in a manner reminiscent of its predecessor, the communist regime. 
The crucial difference, however, is that the Russian presidency, unlike the Soviet 
Politburo, largely lacks the political "transmission belts" essential for mobilizing societal 
resources for national security needs. Y eltsin' s administration failed to mobilize not only 
the public to support the war in Chechnya, but even the military. As Alexander Belkin 
. notes in his chapter, the war in Chechnya has aggravated the crisis in civil-military 
relations that has been brewing throughout Boris Yeltsin's term in office. This crisis 
involved: 
" ... [the] latent struggle for the right to control the military and law-
enforcement policies between the president himself (counseled and 
directed by his security entourage) and other branches of power - the 
prime minister, Security Council, and parliament.... On the level of the 
military itself, the crisis of civil-military relations was manifested in the 
desperate desire of the military to establish their own lobby m the 
parliament in an attempt to affect the national government." 
This attempt resulted in a nearly complete failure during the parliamentary elections 
in December 1995. And finally, the war in Chechnya aggravated the relationship between 
the mass media and the military, because of the latter's attempts to deceive and censor the 
former. 
Initiated to cover up, as suggested by Pavel Felgenhauer, the blunder of the security 
forces' highly visible "covert" operations to overthrow Dudaev, the military attack on 
Chechnya stumbled into a blunder itself, reminiscent of Russian and Soviet defeats in 
1914 and 1941, albeit on a much smaller scale. Poorly trained and hastily organized 
troops, led by incompetent commanders, walked into the trap in Grozny: according to 
Felgenhauer, by New Year's Day of 1996, the General Staff practically lost control of its 
forces in the Chechen capital. The "perfect" plan in the style of the General Staff 
Academy - four armored columns meeting simultaneously in downtown Grozny -
reminds one of Leo Tolstoy's sarcastic analysis in War and Peace of the Russians' 
"perfect" plans for the battle of Austerlitz: both ended in disaster because the enemy 
refused to act in accordance with the plan! 
The experience of combat in Chechnya reveals three salient points. First, the new 
Russian state has not developed a mechanism for learning from its past mistakes: just like 
the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Russian forces marched into a guerrilla war hoping that the 
mere sight of the mass of modem weapons would suffice to intimidate the "natives." 
Second, the tenacity of Russian soldiers has not disappeared altogether: if properly led 
(e.g. the troops ofLt. Gen. Rokhlin, nearly encircled in Grozny), they can put up a good 
fight even for a dubious cause. Third, military reform is desperately needed, but the war 
in Chechnya has cast a doubt on its direction: in their reconquest of Chechnya, the 
Russian military had to rely on the massive application of heavy weapons, not on highly 
mobile, and relatively lightly armed, forces, which are viewed as the wave of the future by 
many reformers and observers of reform in Russia. 
Many in the military establishment, including those not directly responsible for the 
failures in Chechnya, refuse to see any linkage between that war and military reform, 
writes Vitaly Shlykov. Further, he writes: 
"The "Russian military leadership rejects the ·experiences of the Chechen 
war to the extent that it prohibited their inclusion in the study programs of 
the Russian military academies and schools. In the MoD's opinion, this 
conflict is atypical because it's being waged on Russian territory. Instead, 
the studies of the war in Afghanistan are being strengthened." 
Anti-reform political forces ascendant from 1995 to early 1996 in President Y eltsin' s 
entourage were also skeptical of military reform, so the term itself disappeared for a time 
from Y eltsin' s speeches. In democratic Russia, however, the issue of military reform 
could not be buried just because those in power were not inclined to discuss it. In 
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·October 1995, a movement for_military reform, Honor and Motherland, was established 
under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, who had just retired. His main idea 
regarding military reform is that military strength is essential for political and economic 
reform in Russia: in his view, Russia can peacefully conduct reforms only if it is strong 
enough to deter aggression. 
But what about Chechnya itself, and the pbwder keg of the Caucasus? Before the end 
of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet empire, which had put a lid on ethnic 
friction, American analysts tended to ignore the ethnic dimension of international conflict. 
Now, with ethnic conflicts seeming to roar out of control throughout Eurasia, American 
observers frequently view them as inevitable. Sergei Arutyunov argues against such 
fatalism: "The real causes of the war lay in the desires of the powers in conflict to 
dominate larger territories, markets, natural resources and so on." Thus, it is the policies 
pursued by Russian and Caucasian elites that have resulted in the war. A different set of 
policies can result in cessation ofhostilities and economic development of the region. 
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Chapter One 
Possible Consequences of the Chechnya War for the 
General Situation in the Caucasus 
Sergei A. Arutiunov 
Senior Fellow, Institute of Ethnic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences 
Today the Caucasus is one of the hottest, most potentially explosive and dangerous areas 
of the world. It consists of nine or ten distinct territorial formations: the seven republics 
(formerly autonomous and now "sovereign" within the Russian Federation) of Adygea, 
Karachai-Cherkessia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Chechnya and 
Dagestan; two kray or territories, Stavropol and Krasnodar; and often the territory or 
oblast of Rostov-Don is also included in the notion of the Caucasus or, more precisely, 
Northern Caucasus. There is also the Southern Caucasus, or Transcaucasia, which 
became a part of the Russian Empire, paradoxically, much earlier than most territories of 
the Northern Caucasus, but was never seriously regarded as an integral part of Russia and 
always maintained a separate position governed by a vice-roy. In the Soviet era it did not 
become a part of the Russian Federation but formed a number of initially independent 
republics later integrated into the Soviet Union. 
The historic fates and the cultural specificity of these Transcaucasian lands were 
always quite different from lands of the Northern Caucasus. The proper ethnic Russian 
element never played any important role here, contrary to the situation in the Northern 
~casus, where Russian colonization, with the exception of mountainous Dagestan, has 
been very significant even long before the final incorporation of these lands into the 
Empire. 
Today, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence 
by all former constituent Union Republics, there are three .so-called newly independent 
states of Transcaucasia, all nurturing tensions and claims to each other though 
nevertheless maintaining membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Two of these, Georgia and Azerbaijan, when in the USSR initially included territories 
which formally enjoyed nationa~ autonomy as either autonomous republics or 
a1,1tonomous oblasts. 
These were Abkhazia, Adjaria and Southern Ossetia in Georgia, and Nakhichevan 
and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaidjan. The governments of Azerbaidjan and Georgia 
have abolished de jure the autonomy of Southern Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
respectively, but this is in fact just wishful thinking. With the exception of the 
Nakhichevan Republic, all these territories today are practically independent small states. 
Adjaria has not proclaimed its independence but in fact successfully effectuates it. 
All these territories put together are smaller than the territory of France, 
approximately 500,000 square kilometers, and have a considerably smaller population, 
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but ethnically this population is extremely heterogeneous. Apart from Russians, who 
constitute a majority in Rostov-Don, Krasnodar and Stavropol territories and from one to 
fifty percent in practically all other territories and states, there are numerous relatively 
large ethnic entities, numbering from approximately one hundred thousand (e.g. 
Abkhazes, Balkars, Nogais, Dagestanian Laks and Tabassarans), to several hundred 
thousands (e.g. Adygeans, Kabardins, Karachais, Ossetians, Ingushes, Chechens, 
Kumyks, Avars, Dargins and Lezgins), to the nations of several million people (e.g. 
Armenians, Georgians and Azeris). There are also about thirty smaller ethnic groups, 
numbering from one thousand to sixty thousand people (e.g. Abazins, Rutuls, Tsakhurs, 
and Andis), and more than twenty significant immigrant groups (e.g. Germans, Assirians, 
Turks and Greeks). 
Three millennia of more or less documented ethnic history of the Caucasus have 
been filled with virtually incessant wars fought between tribes, kingdoms, principalities, 
clans, fiefs, warlords, barons, bishops, highland communities and other groups. 
These wars were fought under dynastic, tribal, religious and other banners. Very 
~C!fely, if ever, were they fought under purely ethnic banners, but today it is exactly the 
ethnic banners which.are the. favorite tokens of bitterly opposed parties. However, the 
true motive for all these wars has never been religious faith, nor cultural difference, nor 
loyalty to a certain dynasty or sovereign, and today, too, it is not the ethnic difference 
per se. The real reason of these wars has almost invariably been a competition between 
congregated groups or powerful individuals alongside their retinues for the ownership of 
valuable property, primarily arable lands and pastures, which are rather scarce in this 
relatively densely populated, montainous and predominantly arid comer of Eurasia. 
In this contradiction-ridden area, the iron rule of the Tsarist government and the 
ensuing communist regime maintained just for a century a shaky, forced and superficial 
peace that was frequently interrupted by acts of spontaneous violence. But when the 
USSR collapsed, the struggle resumed with a new force. There was suddenly much 
property belonging to unidentifiable owners, the formerly state or collectively owned 
property, which had to be privatized or redistributed. No solid legal base existed to 
govern the rules of this redistribution, nor was there any recognized, authoritative and 
powerful will to enforce ~uch rules, had they existed. The competition for such decision-
making authority is quite naturally aligned along ethnic lines. 
Therefore,4ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus are not unexpected,odd or unnatural. 
On the contrary, they had to be expected. Some leadmg Russian anthropologists and 
ethnopolitologists well expected them, alongside with the general collapse of the Soviet 
Union, already in the late sixties and early seventies. But at that time no open statement 
on that topic was possible, and the heated disputes about possible directions of these 
events and their approximate timing rarely leaked outside the restricted circle of 
"Moscow kitchen conferences." A massive ethnic conflict between Ossetians and 
Ingushes broke out in 1981 in Vladikavkaz (then Ordjonikidze) that very much resembled 
in scope and pattern the recent ethnic clashes in Los Angeles, and was quelled by a 
curfew and introduced troops._· But in 1981 there was no question of the mass media 
covering such a conflict, and it remained unknown to the broad public. The blindly over-
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confident communist authorities, too, failed to draw any lessons from this and several 
other experiences, and hence the events of 1986 in Almaaty and of 1988 in Karabakh and 
Sumgait appeared to them as puzzling and unexpected. 
Karabakh was the first territory in the Caucasus and generally in the Soviet Union 
where, for the first time after.the Second World War, an intention to separate from a larger 
ethno-national body and to create a self-governing or independent state was explicitly 
announced. With the escalation of the Karabakh conflict, soon the same pattern was 
followed by Southern Ossetia, where separatist aspirations were similarly combined with 
and strengthened by irredentist ones. That is, Karabakh wanted not only to separate 
from Azerbaidjan, but to unite with Armenia. Similarly, Southern Ossetia. wanted to 
separate from Georgia and to unite with Northern Ossetia. 
It is interesting to note that while the determination to separate from initial 
"mother-states" (the term "stepmother states" is more metaphorically justified in these 
cases) not only does .not diminish over time in both cases but, on the contrary, becomes 
more pronouncedly adamant with every subsequent stage of the conflict, the irredentist 
aspirations tend to become less frequently articulated and are in fact substituted by a 
desire to maintain and strengthen the already achieved de facto independence, autarky and 
self-reliance. 
In 1992 the ethnic tension in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia seemed to 
achieve its pec~k. The Soviet Union had collapsed. The Russian federation, under the 
well-intentioned but completely inexperienced management (mismanagement would be a 
much more suitable expression) of quasi-democrats Egor Gaidar et a!., was faced with 
rocketing hyperinfla,tion Md the rapid impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of 
its population, as well as the tremendously increased rate of crime, pollution, 
c~tastrOIJP(;!S and. other disasters. It seemed to everybody that to split away from this 
monstrous bog of moral and physical infection would be, if not a panacea, then at least a 
reasonable sanitary measure. 
In this athmosphere, on August 14, Georgia began its aggression against Abkhazia, 
followed in November by the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the Prigorodnii Raion of North 
Ossetia. 
The secessionist strife of South Ossetians in Georgia and of Karabakhtsi 
Armenians in Azerbaidjan found complete understanding and support only in North 
Ossetia and Armenia, respectively, and to some extent among the liberal Russian 
itelligentsia and the Orthodox Church-oriented Russian conservative patriots. These 
forces and strata were unhappy with the rather pronounced anti-Russian stance of the 
majority of Georgian political leaders. Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze then had to 
be more or less silent on these matters. Besides, South Ossetians and Karabakhtsi 
Armenians were decidedly Christian nations, the latter case also struggling to liberate 
themselves from Moslem domination. Both Ossetians and Karabakhtsis were 
demonstrating quite explicitly their pro-Russian standpoints, if not in favor of the then-
existing Russian government, then at least in favor of the Russian nation. Both nations 
linguistically are clearly Indo-European, and their intelligentsia is very fond of 
emphasizing this Indo-European and subsequent Scythian-Alanian and Byzantine legacy. 
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This contrasts sharply with the historiographical ideology of North Caucasian 
Mountaineers, including Abkhasians, who are predominantly and in most parts 
exclusively Muslim, are very proud of their non-Indo-European, but rather Pan-Asiatic, 
Caucasian or Tutkic linguistic alignment, historically tended to be oriented toward the 
Ottoman rather than Byzantine empire, and at least since the 1 00-year long. Caucasian 
War (1763-1864) used to cherish hidden or overt anti-Russian sentiments. 
Russian attitudes toward events in Abkhazia and the Prigorodnii Raion were 
different. The attitude of officials and quasi-democrats towards Abkhazian separatists 
had oscilllated between feeble condemnation and very inconsistent, lukewarm support. 
The Russian military stationed in Abkhazia decided to support the Abkhazian side for 
several reasons: Abkhasians not only behaved correctly to them but had declared 
themselves in favor of a revival of the Soviet Union, where Abkhazia could be one of 
Union republics. Interestingly and significantly, the same position was adopted by 
Dudaev in Chechnya still earlier, and this may explain to some extent initially a rather 
tolerant attitude toward him by many Russian military, ex-military and pro-military, 
including such personalities as ex-KGB general and extreme nationalist Sterligov and 
Zhirinovsky. 
Besides, the Russian military quite predictably were consumea with their hatred 
for Shevardnadze, whom they blamed for "capitulationist" pro:-westem policies, and for 
Georgians, who were attacking Russian military bases stationed in Georgia to seize the 
badly needed weapons. 
But in the Prigorodnii Raion, Russian sympathies were unequivocally on the 
Ossetian side. Ossetian national guards, local Cossacks and regular federal troops of all 
banners were touchingly unanimous in their determination, if not to extinguish 
completely, then at least to oust completely and forever all Ingushes from all villages. and 
sities not only of Prigorodnii raion but also from Vladikavkaz, where lngushes constituted 
about six percent of total population, and where an lngush settlement existed long before 
the foundation of the fortress by the Russians. Only a small fraction of truly liberal and 
democratic Russian intelligentsia dared to raise their voices in defense of Ingushes as of 
objects of open genocide, and Yegor Y akovlev was very promptly dismissed by Y eltsin 
from the position of Chairman of Russian TV exactly for supporting this liberal stand. 
Unlike the situation in Chechnya of 1994-1995, the most outrageous atrocities and 
violations of the human rights in Prigorodnii Raion were committed not by regular federal 
troops (though they too have demonstrated far from innocent behaviour) but by Cossacks 
and especially by Ossetian national guards,· who were mostly recruited from among the 
badly embittered refugees from South Ossetia and other Ossetian-populated towns and 
villages of central and northern Georgia. 
In spite of this obvious difference in positions (albeit very widely ranging) of 
Russians in the crises of Abkhazia and Prigorodnii Raion, all the so-called Caucasian 
Mountaineers2 were unanimous in their support of Abkhazians and in their sympathies 
2 These included Adygeans, Cherkessians, Kabardins, Karachais, Balkars, Chechnyans, Dagestanis,and not 
only the then quite influential and mighty KNK (Confederation of the Nations ofCaucasus),but all 
aboriginal population in general 
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to Ingushes. In Abkhazia there were many thousands of volunteers and mercenaries who 
were fighting against Georgians on the Abkhazian side. This helped Abkhazians to win 
over Georgians, in spite of the latter's prevailing number. True, morale was rather low 
among the Georgian troops, who consisted largely of ex-jail-birds summoned with the 
consent of Russian authorities from various Russian prisons and conscripted into the 
army. The volunteers penetrated Abkhazia by mountain trails, which the Russian troops, 
summoned temporarily to this area, were unable and probably unwilling to control. There 
were no volunteers fighting to defend Ingushes in Prigorodnii Raion, only because the 
president of Ingushetia, Major General Ruslan Aushev, who enjoys enormous prestige 
not only among Ingushes but also among other mountaineers, took a firm position not to 
allow the conflict to escalate and to use only peaceful, legal methods for its solution. In a 
couple of subsequent years his negotiations with Ossetia's president Akhsarbek Galazov 
resulted in a number of agreements providing for a partial return of Ingush refugees to the 
Prigorodnii raion, but the Ossetian authorities have sabotaged the realization of these 
agreements. 
The firm peaceful stand taken by President Aushev, the inconsistency and 
contradictions concerning Abkhazia which existed in the Russian ruling circles, the 
Abkhazians' achievements in 1993 and their final victory after a year of fighting 
prevented an outbreak of a wholesale new Caucasian war in 1993, though there was a 
very serious danger of it. Had Russian troops tried by force to stop the flow of 
volunteers to Abkhazia from Adygea, Karachai, Kabardinia and Chechnya, or had the 
Russian tanks, that despite Aushev's vigorous protest had entered Ingushetia after having 
shelled Ingush villages in the Prigorodnii raion, engaged in a conflict with Dudaev's tanks,3 
then an outbreak of a new Caucasian war involving all Caucasian mountaineers in a fight 
against Russians, Cossacks and perhaps Ossetians, and later probably against each other, 
would have been inevitable. 
But fortunately this did not happen. The Russian government belatedly realized 
that it was in its interest not to prevent Abkhazians to win over Georgians, and then to 
play peacemaker, to put Georgia on its knees and to incorporate it back into Russia's 
geopolitical order. Besides, President Y eltsin was too busy in 1993 with his 
confrontation with the rebellious parliament to let himself be seduced into one more 
adventure. 
Thus an all-out Caucasian war did not begin in 1993. Though in the eyes of the 
progressives and liberals, the Russian troops had been somewhat marred by their 
participation in the genocide of Ingushes in the Prigorodnii Raion, it nonetheless was a 
comparatively small blot noticed by few. On the contrary, the role of Russian troops as 
separating and peace-making forces along South Ossetian-Georgian and Abkhazian-
Georgian armistice lines was generally appreciated by everybody, including Georgians. 
Though the Abkhazian war and the conflict in the Prigorodnii raion (which was 
not a war but a massacre of small, poorly armed bands of Ingushes by heavily armed 
3 and there was a moment when two tank regiments, the Russian and the Chechenian ones, stood face to 
face, divided by three or four hundred meters' distance, on the undemarcated lngushetian-Chechenian border 
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Ossetian national guardsmen and Russian troops) were locally restricted conflicts, their 
consequences were disastrous. In each conflict several thousands of people were killed, 
the majority civilians. The number of places deliberately destroyed, including homes, 
theaters, museums, animal reserves, libraries, national archives and so on in Abkhazia, by 
maraudeering Georgian national guardsmen cannot be evaluated in terms of money. 
Thousands of people on both sides of the conflict, as well as the neutral, were raped, 
tortured, mutilated, humiliated, robbed and expelled from their homes. 
In Northern Ossetia at one time there were as many as 70 thousand refugees from 
Southern Ossetia and other regions of Georgia. About 40 thousand later returned to 
Southern Ossetia, but at least some 30 thousand from other areas of Georgia remain, too 
scared to return. The ethnic Ingushes of Ossetia have been squeezed out completely. 
The total number of these refugees was about 60 thousand. Their houses were either 
seized by Ossetians (mostly by the so-called Kudartsi, the Southern Refugees) or burnt 
and demolished. So far no more than a few hundred Ingushes were allowed to return to 
the ruins of their homes in the Prigorodnii Raion. Today in greatly overpopulated 
lngushetia, among the present population of some 250 thousand inhabitants nearly fifty 
percent are refugees, including huge numbers from Chechnya, living mostly with relatiyes 
and friends. There are about 30 to 40 thousand ethnic Georgians, mostly concentrated in 
or around Tbilisi, who are refugees from Southern Ossetia. In Abkhazia at the beginning 
of the conflict there were about 90 thousand ethnic Abkhazians, more than 220 thousand 
ethnic Georgians, about 50 thousand Armenians, the same number of ethnic Russians, and 
probably some 20-30 thousand Greeks and others. The majority of Russians, Armenians 
and Greeks fled Abkhazia at the beginning of war, mostly to Krasnodar Territory (many 
Greeks fled to Greece). Some have returned, but many remain in Krasnodar or went 
further into Russia. As to the ethnic Georgians, there are about 200 thousand refugees, 
many of them living in tents in awful conditions near the Abkhazian border, eager to 
return but not allowed to. 
All these disasters were followed in October 1994 by the outbreak of the 
Chechnya war, which turned to be summarily perhaps more disastrous than all previous 
conflicts put together. 
Here is probably not a suitable place to describe all the events of this ugly war, all 
the stages of its gradual escalation. Suffice it to say that this war, represented by the 
propaganda machine of Y eltsin's administration as a police operation intended to restore 
law and order and to disarm illegal bands, resulted in several thousands of deaths and 
several times more general casualties (wounded, frozen, etc.) among federal Russian 
troops alone. It has brought about at least 30 thousand dead, many more wounded and 
injured, and ten times more homeless civilians, many of them ethnic Russians. It exceeds 
the losses of the horrible earthquake of 1988 in Armenia, which was considered a disaster 
of a first grade national scale. It is several times more than the losses in the 1995 
earthquake in Kobe, Japan. 
As a rule there are no right sides in ethnic wars, and all recent wars in the_ 
Caucasus, the Chechnya war being no exception, have been ethnic. Usually the ultra-
nationalist party or leader, to deliberately or spontaneously drag their compatriots inlQ 
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escalating a war, m~ipulates such notions as a menace to the national existence of the 
given ethnic group, oppresion of its cultural integrity and continuity, gradual 
disappearance of its native language and so on. These phenomena do exist to a certain 
extent in reality. But the biggest fear experienced by an ethnic group or a nation is the 
demographic fear. When a certain group realizes that its birth rate is lower than that of 
the neighbouring group, it fears fmding itself increasingly in a minority position and 
concludes that the "ethn.i..c-cleansing" of the neighbouring group is the only possible 
escape from the menacing situation. 
This was definitely the basis of the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict. For decades, 
both due to the natural increase and even more so to a forced or sponsored immigration, 
the Georgian population of Abkhazia was growing much faster than the Abkhazian. The 
same can be said about Azeris versus Armenians not only in Karabakh, but also in the 
southern region of Armenia, Zangezur, where prior to the conflict of 1988 the percentage 
of Azeri population was steadily growing. In the end of 1988 they all were forced to flee 
to Azerbaidjan. The percentage of Ingushes was similarly steadily growing in the 
Prigorodnii raion and in Vladikavkaz. The same demographic correlation can be observed 
in Lebanon, Assam and a number of other areas stricken by ethnic conflicts throughout 
the world. 
But certainly this was not the case in Chechnya, where the growth of the 
indi~enous population greatly outpaced that of the ethnic Russians. The indigenous 
population is a minority, and the preservation of the native language and culture is 
seriously endangered, for example, in Mordovia in the Middle Volga Basin. Some ethnic 
tensions can be observed in Mordovia too, but by no means are they attaining the scale 
where attempts at "ethnic cleansing" and internecine warfare begin. 
To some extent the origins of the present conflicts in the Caucasus may be 
compared to the origins of the First World War. As we all know today, it was triggered 
by a fanatic nationalist. 
But the real causes of the war lay in the desires of the powers in conflict to 
domiqate over larger territories, markets, natural resources and so on. Only the ruling 
classes of these powers were interested in these objectives, but the working masses had to 
die for them, although they might have lived perfectly in peace, as Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims once did in the now war-burnt Sarajevo. 
The current conflicts in the Caucasus all have been triggered by extremist 
statements, demands and irresponsible actions of local ethnic or minority patriots and 
leaders, but the basic responsibility lies with the governments, ruling establishments and 
money-making clique~. These sometimes include local elements, but basically represent 
larger powers, such as Russia, Georgia or Azerbaidjan, which have attempted to safeguard 
for themselves the privatization of property, the incomes from covert and illegal 
economic operations and so on. There is no doubt that Dudaev and his cohorts were 
involved in such operations. But there is also no doubt that such people as Zavgaev and 
his ilk, overthrown by Dudaev, similarly attempted to utilize the unstable situation of 
1990s in their own interests and those of their friends. Definitely there is no doubt that 
behind the ethnically tinted Chechen front cover there have always stood much more 
13 
powerful, influential (possessing the broadest Army-, KGB- and CPSU-based 
connections), anonymous and informal groups, organizations and personalities who had 
absolutely nothing in common with the so-called "Caucasian" ethnic identity. 
There is no proof, but nevertheless serious reasons exist to believe that an 
unhindered existence for more than three years of a de facto free economic zone in 
Chechnya, and then a sudden determination to eliminate Dudaev, can be explained by the 
following reasoning. Initially to have the Chechen cover and a customs- and control-free 
opening between certain corrupt Russian civilian and army circles,~and ~'mafio~i" 
businessmen, on one hand, and the rather odious Near Eastern and other foreign partners, 
on the other hand, was for a time quite useful and comfortable. But when Dudaev and his 
group became a menace, demanding a bigger share of illegal incomes or threatening to 
blackmail, then the necessity arose to lure the President of Russia and the whole might of 
the Russian Army and secret services into an attempt to eliminate Dudaev. 
At the beginning of his political and nationalistic activity, Dudaev might have been 
motivated by purely idealistic, quixotic values and goals. Or he might not have been. This 
is, after all, irrelevant. What is really important is that the main undercurrents operating 
in the Russo-Chechnyan war are political and economic forces and interests that in their 
cumulative scope and scale far exceed the scope and limits of the tiny Chechnyan 
Republic, an infinitesimally small part of Russia's territory, constituting less than one 
percent of Russia's total population. Only this can explain the extreme cruelty of this 
war, the massiveness of the war effort, and the readiness to ignore all protests and 
indignation from the world community and the liberal and democratic opposition within 
Russia. It would be not unheard of to say that this war is indeed extremely unpopular. 
Sociological surveys indicate that if the question of whether Russia should grant 
Chechnya independence and withdraw all troops from its territory were put on a 
referendum today, more than 50 percent of the voters would approve this solution, 
provided that the northern districts, which were part of Stavropol until 1957 and remain 
populated largely by ethnic Russians, remain within the Russian Federation. The reason 
for this lies not in sympathy with the heroic struggle of Chechnyans for this 
independence, not in a feeling of historical justice or of guilt for the innumerable 
sufferings that the centuries of Russian aggression and oppression have caused the people 
of Chechnya. Such motivations can be found among a very thin stratum of the liberal 
intelligentsia, but on the whole they are alien to the masses of Russian people who for the 
most part still consider Chechens if not a horde of bloodthirsty bandits, then at least an 
uncivilized, savage tribe that constitutes a permanent threat to the peace in Russia's 
southern regions. The Chechen diaspora in central Russia, Moscow and other large cities 
is considered the main ethnic substratum for all criminal and "mafiosi" activity, an 
opinion which has no basis in reality. 
But the Russian population as a whole is very tired of this war and its calamities. 
The war has already cost the lives of thousands of Russian soldiers. Its total monetary 
_£gst amounts to some 10 billion dollars. In many regions of Russia, as I witnessed myself 
in Siberia during the summer of 1995, not only have policemen, army officers, and other 
budgeted workers not received their salaries for several months, but they are also 
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explicitly told that the money initially designated to pay them had been pumped instead 
into the "restoration" of destructions caused by the war in Chechnya. 
It is essential to notice that all these "post-perestroika" wars in the Caucasus so 
far have followed one general pattern. They begin with a decisive, but peaceful 
declaration by a newly elected authority, like a president or a supreme council, about their 
intention to separate, to be independent, to change relations with the center from 
autonomy to confederation, or the like. \I1(en a campaign of slander, menaces, and 
defamation from Moscow follows. After an indefinite period of escalation of hostile 
actions, the,center initiates an armed invasion under a pretext. M first the smaller nation 
suffers great losses and is forced to retreat considerably, but it later launches a successful 
counter attack, which ends in a serious defeat of federal forces. Then a stali:mate follows, 
and an armistice or temporary peace is established. In no case so far has there been a final 
resolution of a conflict or a formal recognition of a new status. 
This was the sequence of events in Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Prigorodnii Raion of Ossetia seems to be an exception. There was no declaring 
government body, just a popular movement of Ingushes to secede from Ossetia and to 
reunite with Ingushetia. Later they were defeated and ousted from Ossetia. But in all 
probability, despite all sabotage by Galazov's administration, Ingushes will in the end 
return to Prigorodnii raion, and in the end it will be as lost for Ossetia-Alania as South 
Ossetia seems lost for Georgia. This is because the tombstones in this area are mostly 
lngush, not Ossetian. 
The main reason why the smaller nations win and much more mighty centers are 
defeated is simple. The Georgian troops in Abkhazia, the Azeri troops in Karabakh and 
the Russian troops in Chechnya are not very eager to fight for their governments' 
domination over lands quite different from most soldiers' native lands, with a different 
landscape, different tombstones, different place names and a different indigenous 
population. These lands are alien to most soldiers, despite all the governments' quasi-
patriotic propaganda. On the other. hand, the indigenous people of Karabakh, Abkhazia, 
Ingushetia and Chechnya are fighting to defend their own homes, their ancestors' 
tombstones, their native territory and their national survival. They will fight to the last, 
and there is no means to vanquish them but to exterminate them completely. 
Unfortunately, probably many years and decades of mutual mistrust and alienation will 
have to elapse before Ingushetians and Ossetians, or Armenians and Azeris, or Georgians 
and Abkhazians live peacefully side by side as good neighbors, which in principle they 
were successfully doing still some ten or twenty years ago, despite, or much more 
plausibly because of, all the intrigues, injustices, biases and oppression by their 
communist rulers. 
What was happening in Chechnya for more than half a year and to some extent 
still is happening now is unequivocally genocide. Everyone who wants to be a liberal, a 
democrat, a humanitarian, must realize that the killing of Chechens by Russians in 
Chechnya is no more Russia's internal affair than the killing of Jews in Germany was 
Germany's internal affair. Chechnya is not Russia. Chechnya was and is no more an 
integral part of Russia than Algeria was an integral part of France. Though perhaps on a 
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slightly smaller scale, Russian occupation troops in Chechnya are doing in principle, 
quality, form and content exactly the what the German Wehrmacht did in Belarus in 1941. 
The name of the little Chechen town, Sainashki, sounds today as sinister as Khatyn in 
Belarus, or as Lidice in Czechoslovakia, and more sinister than My Lai in Vietnam. And 
the response today in Chechnya is the same as it was in the 1940s in Belarus. It is a 
cruel, bloody and pityless response~ but it cannot possibly be anything but irreconciliable 
guerrilla warfare. 
This response is not rooted in simple ethnic hatred. Chechens do not nurture any 
inherent hatred towards the average Russian. By their traditional ethics they are rather 
disposed towards good neighbourly relations with those peoples with whom they live 
side by side. In the history of their relations with their neighbours there have been 
conflicts, as have happened between all neighbouring communities in the Caucasus, but in 
general, at least in the recent decades, relations of mutual respect and benevolence 
prevailed. 
But it must be born in mind that for a Chechen, more than for any other 
Caucasian, to be a man means, inter alia, to remember the names of seven generations of 
paternal ancestors: the father, the grandfather and so on. And not only their names are to 
be remembered and faithfully transmitted from generation to generation, but also the basic 
circumstances of their lives, their deaths, and the locations of their tombstones. All 
together, this constitutes an enormous depth of historic memory. Naturally, in so many 
cases the remembered deaths occurred at the hands of Russian soldiers: under Catherine 
the Great, Nicholas I, Stalin, and now Y eltsin. Thus, for practically every Chechen, a 
Russian soldier and especially a Russian general are considered to be evil incarnate, worse 
than the Devil himself. 
Furthermore, Chechnya was and is a society of military democracy. In the 
development of a society, in the theoretical framework of the Russian school of 
Evolutionist and Marxist anthropology, the military democracy is a stage way above 
primitive communalism but below a completely developed class society. 
This means that Chechnya never had any kings, khans, barons or princes of their 
own. Some parts of Chechnya were sometimes in a more or less nominal vassal 
dependency of Kabardin princes, but in practical terms this was hardly noticeable. There 
were attempts by some powerful Chechen families to proclaim themselves princes or 
something similar, but with very poor results: most often the families who dared to 
undertake such an endeavour were simply exterminated by their neighbours. Quite unlike 
most other Caucasian nations, there had never been any feudal system in Chechnya. 
Traditionally, if it was ever governed at all as a distinct entity, it was done by a council of 
elders on the basis of con census. But like any other military democracy, such as the 
Iroquois in America or the Zulu in southern Africa, Chechens retained an institution of a 
_l>Upreme military chief. In peacetime,that chief had no power at all. No sovereign 
authority was recognized , and the nation might be fragmented in a hundred of rival clans. 
However, in time of danger, when confronted with aggression, the rival clans 
would unite and elect a military leader. This leader might be known to everyone as a very 
unpleasant personality with many faults, but nevertheless would be elected just on the 
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basis of being an experienced military leader. While the war was going on, this leader 
would be obeyed. This was the kind of authority enjoyed by such leaders as Sheikh 
Mansur (Ushurma) at the end of the eighteenth century, and even the famous Imam 
Shamil in the first half of the nineteenth century was obeyed by Chechens mainly along 
the same lines. 
It must be understood then that the institution of the presidency is generally not 
suited to the conditions of self-government in Chechnya. Dudaev was definitely a poor 
preside11t. But even the best possible president would last in Chechnya only as long as 
the euphoria of long-desired independence from Russia, and this in tum would be possible 
only as long as this independence was menaced. Dudaev understood this well and 
therefore did his best to maintain among his subjects a continuously heated anti-Russian 
paranoia. 
Djokhar Dudaev is a typical example of a temporary military leader. His 
presidency is, in this sense, an historical accident. Many well informed Russian 
observers believe that in peace time, in cooperation with the corrupt Russian civil and 
military bosses, his circle conducted gigantic smuggling operations of arms and drugs 
through Chechnya from Russia to Iran, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. Before the 
Russian invasion, he had lost a great deal of prestige and popularity. By September 1994 
perhaps no more than 20 percent of the total Chechen population were supporting him, 
and any strong support was limited almost exclusively to his own clan and other groups 
related to him either by clan or business ties. 
But despite all ofDudaev's misdeeds, due to the military leadership traditions and 
to his indisputable military talents, many Chechens have been willing to fight under his 
guidance or that of a similar authoritative and experienced leader as long as they feel 
threatened by Russian invaders. And in the future, Dudaev or no Dudaev, many 
Chechens will fight the Russian occupiers even if, as it is likely, all the other mountaineer 
nationalities in the Caucasus offer little more than lip support. Thus, the war and its 
atrocities in a guerilla form will probably continue for a very long time. Today the hatred 
and determination for vengeance by many who lost their families due to bombings and 
shellings by the Russian army are so great, that even when a field commander is willing to 
conclude an armistice with the Russian forces and cease fire, his soldiers simply desert 
him and shift to another commander determined to continue the fight. But the general 
situation in the Caucasus has changed considerably in the two years since Russia's last 
parliamentary elections, and it continues to change in an unfavourable direction for 
Chechen fighters. 
As I mentioned earlier, two years ago, in 1993, there was a real danger that a minor 
provocation might lead to a great new Caucasian War. That war would have been 
launched first of all by the KNK against the central government in Moscow, against its 
ex-communist puppets in local governments, against much feared Cossack organizations, 
and against all Russians in general. The mountaineer populations had their nerves on 
their edge and, besides, the central government looked slow and inefficient and probably 
was so in fact. But this is not the case now. The October 1993 shelling of the Russian 
Supreme Soviet by the military loyal to Y eltsin has obviously strengthened the central 
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governillent's confidence that it can do whatever it wants, uncontrolled and unpunished. 
There are certain limits to this overconfidence, of course, but it is still very high. On the 
other hand, in most former areas of fighting, a ceasefire, no matter how shaky, is more or 
less observed. Only in Chechnya, and to some degree in the ethnically closely related 
areas of Ingushetia and Northern Dagestan, is the resistance to the Russian occupation 
really widespread and strong. In these areas,and probably in these areas only, a situation 
like the conflict in the Northern Ireland may be expected to continue for many years to 
come. 
However, all other mountaineer nationalities in the Northern Caucasus will 
probably continue to render only lip service to the Chechens and their struggle. There 
may be some fanatic nationalists and even some small organized groups that will side 
with the Chechens in their guerilla warfare, just as the IRA used to recruit its members 
not only from among the ethnic Irish, or as the PLO terrorists were represented not only 
by Palestinian Arabs. But a massive anti-Russian movement, which could be expected 
only a couple of years ago, is now impossible. 
For this there are many reasons. Eirst of all, people in Russia in general and in the 
Caucasus in particular are increasingly sick and tired of politics. , The phrases that a few 
years earlier would ignite a mob with "rightful indignation" now are perceived by a mass 
of critically minded individuals as cheap nationalist propaganda. The nationalist leaders 
have had enough time to largely politically discredit themselves through their inefficiency, 
inconsistency, lack of responsibility, and often dishonesty in money matters. Meanwhile 
the the former communist puppet presidents in many republics have proved that they are 
no longer puppets. They have succeeded in many areas to consolidate up to 70 or 80 
percent of popular support. This is largely because these presidents, namely [FIRST 
NAMES] Djarimov in Adygea, Khubiev in Karachai-Cherkessia, Kokov in Kabardin-
Balkaria, Galazov iii Ossetia-Alania, in maintaining good relations with the federal 
government have proven very adept at soliciting considerable financial donations and 
other benefits for their republics. The mechanism at work is simple but efficient: some 
grudging criticism of government and some nationalist phrases by popular organizations 
to help convince the government in Moscow that carrots rather than obviously 
discredited sticks are much preferred by generally loyal republics. The heads of local 
governments, demonstrating both their loyalty and the difficulties they ostensibly 
experience in preserving the social peace on their territories, successfully collect the 
carrots. 
Also, the tragic example of Abkhazia and of the lngushes in the Prigorodnii Raion 
of North Ossetia has convinced the majority of the working population, especially small 
owners, farmers, small businessmen and the like, that any attempt to change by force the 
status quo to favor one ethnic group may result only in thousands of lost lives, total 
destruction of villages and property, and hundreds of thousands of homeless refugees. 
Today most people vote for the status quo. The peoples of the Caucasus do not fear the 
"might" of the Russian army attempted in Chechnya and if attacked will fight to the last, 
but they do fear the damage they may inflict upon themselves if they start a conflict. 
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The recent development of the situation in Kabardin-Balkaria is a striking example 
of this change in attitudes. The Balkarian nationalist leader, General [FIRST NAME] 
Beppaev, became famous by organizing a huge number of protests, like seizing public 
buildings, hunger strikes, meetings, demonstrations and so on, to demand a separation of 
Balkaria from Kabardinia. 
Naturally, Kabardins felt very offended by these actions and, in a less violent 
way, were preparing some countermeasures. At times it seemed that conflict and 
bloodshed between Balkars and Kabardins were inevitable. But then the government of 
this two-nationed republic4 wisely proposeed, in the very end of 1994, a referendum in 
which only ethnic Balkars were to participate. About 75 percent of the potential voters 
participated, and more than 90 percent of them voted to maintain the status quo, against a 
separation. 5 This is a fine example of the ratio between silent majorities and nmsy 
~
minorities in most areas of the Caucasus. 
In principle, the same prevalence of peacefully minded people soon might be 
characteristic for Chechnya, as well. Here, too, people are growing increasingly fed up 
with nationalist rhetoric. Chechens have suffered from the Tsarist colonialist and Stalinist 
~----·--.,~·_, ______ ,""'-' 
neo-imperialist policies more than any other nation in the Caucasus, and probably second 
only to the Crimean Tatars on the all-Russian scale, so the determination to maintain 
independence was nearly universal among them, but they would probably agree to some 
kind of associate status with Russia. In 1993-1994 the number of Dudaev's supporters in 
Chechnya was falling rapidly and would have very soon dropped to a very low level, had 
not the stupid (or criminally irresponsible) policy of Yeltsin's generals turned 90 percent 
of Dudaev's bitter enemies into his adamant supporters. Without this ill-fated 
intervention, Dudaev soon would have become, like his colleague Beppaev, a general 
without an army. 
The future of Chechnya, the whole Caucasus, and finally Russia in general is 
determined by many factors, some of which are stable and permanent, and others of 
which are unstable and subject to rapid change. 
So what is stable and what is unstable in the Caucasus? The configurations of 
relations between ethnic groups, their mutual claims, and their basic historical aspirations 
are stable. They are so stable that archive materials of 1918 often seem to have been 
written in 1992. But at every given moment the readiness to fight or to compromise, to 
conform temporarily with the status quo or to strive to change it may be different and 
change easily, according to the prevalent conditions. The sympathies towards certain 
leaders are, too, extremely unstable and may change rapidly from admiration and 
adoration to hatred and contempt. The absolute prevalence of the role of shame over that 
of guilt has been stable throughout the millennia.6 The inability of all Russian 
4 In fact, Kabardins fonn nearly 50 percent of the total population, Russians about 30 percent, and Balkars 
only I 0 percent. 
5 Two other proposals by nationalists, the creation of two separate parliaments, the Balkar and the 
Kabardinian ones, and a gerrymandering of raions (districts) as to make them ethnically homogeneous, 
were also rejected. · 
6 Shame is understood basically as an irretrievable or difficultly retrievable loss of honor, decency, dignity, 
mutual respect and self-respect, which is to be avoided at any price. 
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governments (and of most rank and file ethnic Russians, as well) to understand this fact of 
paramount importance is also very stable. Hence the constant failures to find mutual 
understanding. Cossacks are, perhaps, to some extent an exception, because living for 
centuries side by side with the highlanders, they not only borrowed from them their 
traditional costume and many customs, but have acquired also some traditional values, 
including the overemphasis on shame and honour. 
But despite difference of values and centur!es of confrontations, the Caucasus 
needs Russia. It needs Russia and its money, technology and education much more than 
the present Russia needs the Caucasus. Despite all the conflicts and contradictions, the 
centripetal tendencies in the foreseeable future will prevail over the centrifugal ones. But 
the way to the structural reintegration is going to be painful and slow. 
Ossetia will certainly remain loyal to Moscow, and territories west of Ossetia will 
remain more or less peaceful. Any violation of peaee here may result not from the 
activity of Chechen agents or their local supporters, but from the arrogance and extremism 
of the Russian Cossacks. But east of Ossetia, rebellious Ingushes and Chechens will 
continue to cause trouble for many years and may also ignite a conflict in Dagestan, where 
thirty ethnic groups are at each other's throat. But because the contradictions between 
various highland tribes are stronger than between all mountaineers put together and 
Russia, it will sometimes be possible for Russia to play peace maker, as it did between 
Abkhazia and Georgia. 
The religious factor tends to be grossly exaggerated by most authors and 
observers. • In fact, ·religion plays a comparatively minor part in the events in 1he 
Caucasus. People align along ethnic lines, not religious ones. Some 20 percent of north 
Ossetians are Muslims, but this did not prevent them from demonstrating absolute 
solidarity with their Christian compatriots in their determination to expel Muslim 
Ingushes from Ossetia. However, in other places Islam and the la,w of Shariat may 
sometimes prevent Muslims from killing other Muslims. One has to differentiate, 
however, between the formally educated,. sophisticated and ecumenistically oriented 
clergy on the one hand, and ignorant and fanatic, self-proclaimed Mullahs on the other. 
The paradigms of the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus are found throughout the 
world. Least of all do these conflicts, however, resemble the situation in Bosnia. But 
there are striking parallels with Ulster, Algeria, Palestine and even South Africa. And 
though the Caucasus is relatively small, its unrest may be extremely disruptive to Russia 
in general. Considerable groups of Chechens have fled the calamities of war, even to the 
easternmost towns with ethnic Russian and indigenous populations, in northeastern 
Siberia, as far east as the Chukotka peninsula. 
But regardless of Russia's political fate in the immediate future, there are only two 
alternatives to every trouble-stricken area in the Caucasus. One is a total extermination or 
expulsion (forced emigration) of the indigenous rebel populations: Abkhazians, South 
Ossetians, Karabakh Armenians, lngushes. Georgians and Azeris would not hesitate to 
implement this alternative, as the North Ossetians did not hesitate to do in Prigorodnii 
raion with the Ingushes. But R!-lssia cannot afford this, because the image of a democracy 
20 
and international public opinion is much more important for Russia than it is for Georgia 
and Azerbaidjan. 
The other alternative means that the indigenous people will become the 
unequivocally dominant or even the practically sole population of their respective 
territories. Even Ingushes may in the end return to Prigorodnii raion and gradually 
squeeze out Ossetians. It must be noticed that just as in the New World the black 
population usually succeeds in squeezing out whites and not vice versa, in the same way 
the less advanced minority may be successful in squeezing out the more cultured 
majority. This is the main fear of the Karabakh Armenians, who are unwilling to allow 
even a small group of Azeris back into Karabakh. They know that such a thing has 
already happened in Nakhichevan, where no Armenians were left by the 1980s, while 
they constituted 50 percent of the population in 1920s. 
Therefore there is a very small probability for Georgians to return to Abkhazia or 
to South Ossetia, and for a large number of Russians to Chechnya. Russians return to the 
ruined basements of their homes in Groznyi because they have no other shelter elsewhere, 
but they will try to leave at the tiniest possibility. Thus, more and more territories in the 
Caucasus are and will be turning .into ethnically homogeneous areas. 
This is achieved at the expense of Krasnodar, Stavropol, and even Rostov-Don 
territories, which accept, albeit unwillingly and grudgingly, a huge number of refugees and 
immigrants, who are not only Russians, but much more (as percentage to already existing 
communities) Armenians, Jews, Meskhetian Turks, Tatars, Koreans, and, in the Republic 
of Kalmykia/ also Chechens and Dagestanis. In these areas, ethnic heterogeneity is 
rapidly increasing, with all its accompanying problems of tension, attempts at pogroms of 
refugees, and so on. 
There are reasons to believe that the already shrunken territory of Russia is not 
going to shrink any more. Chechnya will be finally forced into some kind of association, 
and nobody else will now try to secede. But the consequences of the Chechnya war will 
be felt in Russia for many years and decades (as were the consequences of Vietnam in the 
United States, or of Afghanistan in Russia), and they will be very grave. Even when the 
war is nominally terminated, the terrorists acts of small groups and vendettas carried out 
by individuals will continue. No pilot known to have ever participated in bombing the 
civilian population in Chechnya, no officer with a Chechnya war record will ever feel safe 
from revenge, whether he would live in Moscow or Vladivostok. And any puppet 
bureaucrat of the Russian-installed civil government in Chechnya will never feel safe, 
either. 
But this is not all. The United States prosecuted Lieutenant Calley for his role in 
the massacre at My Lai. He was just a scape goat, no doubt, and there were hundreds 
much worse than Calley who never were prosecuted. But in Russia the situation will be 
different. Dozens and hundreds of lieutenants, corporals and colonels should be 
prosecuted for Samashki and scores of similar events. Certainly, very few of them, if 
7 The Republic of Kalmykia (Khalmgh Tanghch) is a nation within the Russian Federation, with a total 
population of approximately 350,000, just north of Dagestan and Stavropol. 
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any, ever will be. But there is enough evidence already to prosecute Pavel Grachev, 
Minister of Internal Affairs Victor Y erin, and a huge number of other generals, just for the 
irresponsible inefficiency and shameless lies at all stages of this war that resulted in the 
unnecessary deaths of many Russian soldiers, let alone for the brutal violations of human 
rights and international conventions. And if and when Yeltsin is succeded as president by 
someone willing to create an image of a democrat and an advocate of the state of law, this 
person may order to start a prosecution. It will be done, of course, not for the sake of 
democratic principles or human rights, but to gather political capital, to redistribute 
spheres of interests among one's own supporters, and for many similar practical, selfish 
reasons. But such prosecutions most certainly will be attempted. 
This is well understood by everyone constituting the present de facto military 
junta surrounding today the president of Russia and influencing his decisions. Therefore 
these people will do their best either to defraud or not to allow a new presidential 
election, to organize a provocation to introduce an all-Russia state of emergency, and- if 
anything happens to Y eltsin and his pouvoire personnelle -to carry out a coup d'etat, to 
place in power a Bonapartist figure able to defend their interests and their immunity. 
And this is not yet all. The Caucasus possesses all necessary resources to be one 
of the prosperous areas of the world, like Spain or Greece. But for this it needs to 
develop its tourist industry, to create a stable, numerous and influential stratum of small 
and medium owners of private property, of farmers, shopkeepers, restaurateurs and other 
entrepreneurs. The main obstacle for this is instability, absence of firm peace, and the 
rule of post-communist bureaucrats who are the least interested to allow a middle class to 
appear. The consequences of the Chechnya war will provide favourable conditions for 
an indeterminately prolonged rule of these bureaucrats, for more authoritarianism and 
voluntarism in economic matters, and thus create the prerequisites for a painfully long 
economic stagnation in the Caucasus and, perhaps, in Russia in general. 
22 
Chapter Two 
War in Chechnya: The Impact On Civil-Military 
Relations In Russia 
Major Aleksandr Belkin (Ret.) 
Deputy Executive Secretary 
Council for Defense and Foreign Policy 
"Chechnya is the deepest disappointment of my presidency." 
--Boris Yeltsin, President ofthe Russian Federation8 
At our last meeting here in Monterey in November 1994, some of the Russian 
participants, myself included, expressed their concern that in the case of Moscow's direct 
military intervention in Chechnya, Russia might face a challenge of terrorism - brutal 
armed violence could backfire into its cities. At the same time other voices aired serious 
doubts of any long-lasting and well-organized resistance in Chechnya, as well as 
skepticism about the potentiality of organized Chechen terrorist activities inside Russia. 
I am glad to admit that I have underestimated the restraint and sensibility of the 
people of Chechnya (qualities having nothing to do with Dudayev's regime), though the 
hostage crisis in Budyonnovsk not only exposed the potential of terrorism, on the one 
hand, but also made it clear that terrorism was not the Chechens' primary intention, on 
the other. Certain analysts characterized Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's approach to 
resolving the Budyonnovsk crisis as a disastrous one. They predicted that the bargain 
with the terrorists over human lives established a dangerous precedent which would 
trigger a series of nation-wide bloody terrorist acts, not limited just to Chechnya and the 
Northern Caucasus. Fortunately, time has not proved the accuracy of their warnings. 
But the Budyonnovsk tragedy was a turning point of the war in Chechnya. The name of 
Budyonnovsk, a small North Caucasian town in the Stavropol district, has become a 
polysemantic political symbol: an indication of the incompetence and incapability. of 
Y eltsin' s administration, evidence of the Russian armed forces' weakness and their 
inability to win a local conflict, a symptom of a split within the government, a 
manifestation of the Russian parliament's impotence. 
* * * 
8 M. Eismont, "Chechnya- samoye silnoye razocharovaniye prezidenta Yeltsina" (Chechnya Is "The 
Deepest Disappointment" Of President Yeltsin). Segodnya, October 20, 1995, p. 2. 
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" ... The war in the Caucasus continued for sixty years. Little by little 
Russia got used to the idea that such a state of affairs was natural and 
should last almost forever, particularly since the Caucasus for nearly half a 
century remained in a dark shadow, and the public judged it based on a few 
novels and stories told by people who visited the Pyatigorsk mineral spas . 
... Our society on the whole was not even cognizant for what purpose the 
state had been striving for subjugation of the mountainous country so 
persistently and with such sacrifices .... Russia rejoiced in patriotism at the 
conquest of the eastern mountains as a victory over a stubborn enemy, 
irrespective of the great importance of that development which is still 
much more distinctly realized abroad than in this country. "9 
These observations on Russia's first war in the Caucasus were published more 
than a century ago in a book by Major General Rostislav A. Fadeev, one of the best 
Russian military historians of the last century. Unlike Russia of the early nineteenth 
century, modem Russian society is seriously concerned about the situation in Chechnya, 
where an undeclared local-war-scale constabulary operation was launched by the "power 
structures"- the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Federal 
Security Service - by the secret decrees of the president. 
The Chechen war has effected the climax of the crisis of civil-military relations in 
post-Soviet Russia. This crisis is rooted in the last years of the former Soviet Union, and 
ripened during President Yeltsin's term of office. 
The paramount causes of this crisis include: 
• The elimination of the former totalitarian Soviet system of subjective 
civilian control of the military through the Communist Party and state 
security (KGB) structures and the institution of political instructors; 10 
• The failure to establish efficient executive control and legislative oversight 
over the military; 
• The formal concentration of the oversight authority by the president 
(though it turns out that Yeltsin applied his famous formula of the 
powers of the subjects of the Russian Federation - "Take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow" - to the military leadership as well, 
although in this case swallo~ing means not endangering presidential 
positions); 
9 R. A. Fadeev, "Shestdesyat let Kavkazskoi voiny. Pisma s Kavkaza" (Sixty Years of the Caucasian War. 
Letters From The Caucasus}, Sobraniye sochinenii (St Petersburg, 1889. Vol. I. Part I. pp. 1-2). 
10 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) pp. 80-81. 
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• The underdevelopment of civil society, which would hold liberal and 
democratic social values, in Russia; 
• The loose social control of the ruling regime in general; 
• The persisting non-democratic, authoritarian traditions and Byzantine 
methods of the post-Soviet political culture. 
The rise and evolution of the Chechen republic closely correlates with the 
unsettled civil-military relations in Russia. It is extremely significant that traditionally 
warlike mountainous people of Chechnya and Ingushetiya, who never admit any supreme 
authority, elected former Air Force and Army generals (Dzhokhar Dudaev and Ruslan 
Aushev respectively) as their national leaders. On the other hand it was very meaningful 
that, while campaigning to be the first Russian president, Boris Y eltsin favored another 
uniformed military - a Hero of the Soviet Union, Aleksandr Rutskoi -' to run with him 
for the vice-presidency in 1991. Politicians were actively seeking the military's support, 
while the military were actively entering the policy-making process on every level in the 
Soviet Union, in Russia, in Chechnya, and so forth. 
It is characteristic that representatives of both civilian authorities 11 and military 
leadership12 of Russia were involved already in the very first attempts at settlement in 
Chechnya. Likewise, when their brief, unskilled attempts to peacefully solve the problem 
through political dialogue with the new Chechen leadership (though not quite legitimate, 
but the only really potent one) failed, both civilian and military administration 
demonstrated a rare concord and hastily resorted to armed violence to regain control over 
Chechnya. 
To further understand the inevitability of the armed involvement in Chechnya, it 
is essential to comprehend why President Y eltsin declined any possibility of a personal 
meeting with Dudayev as a last hope to peacefully end the crisis. Certain individual 
features of Yeltsin's character made it psychologically difficult, if not impossible (though 
not excusable), to meet his political twin from Chechnya. Like Yeltsin himself, Dudayev 
strove for political power. And just Yeltsin was prepared to facilitate the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union in order to win power from Gorbachev, Dudayev was ready to 
sacrifice the unity of the Russian Federation for his own independent rule in Chechnya 
- that was one reason why Y eltsin did not, or could not, act decisively in the fall of 1991 
to stop Dudayev's secessionism. Yeltsin in Moscow readily accepted forcible solutions 
to political disputes between different branches of state authority, just as Dudayev did in 
Grozny, . It was characteristic that Dudayev suggested, in a private letter to Y eltsin in 
April 1993, that the best solution for Yeltsin's conflict with the parliament was to 
disband the Supreme Soviet and hold simultaneous elections to a new legislature and a 
11 i.e. Speaker of the former Supreme Soviet of Russia Ruslan Khasbulatov, Yeltin's close aide Gennady 
Burbulis, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai 
12 i.e. Rutskoi, Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev 
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referendum on a new constitution! 13 When in September 1993 Yeltsin "followed" that 
advice, Dudayev stated in the Chechen press that "Yeltsin's resolution directed the 
development of events in Russia into a logical channel" which should lead to complete 
democracy .14 
If the decision-makers in the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense had been better 
overseen by other social institutions, and if they had been 'better educated in the history 
of Russian policy and military history in the Caucasus, they might not have made all 
those ridiculous mistakes which led to the national crisis over Chechnya. 
\ Firstly, they lost and misused time to prevent the development of Chechen 
secessionism in 1991. They have shown their political impotence and military inability 
by declaring a state of emergency in Chechnya and even airlifting paratroopers there, but 
failing to decisively engage them. More than that, they practically armed the forces of the 
quasi-independent Chechnya by leaving huge arsenals to Dudayev, 15 and for more than 
three years they let him train and prepare those forces for future combat. 
Secondly, they ignored experience of Russia's annexation of the Caucasus, 
neglected historical, cultural and religious peculiarities characteristic to Chechens (as well 
as to other Moslem Mountaineers): their traditional belligerency, hostility to any 
supreme authority, defiance of death in combat, tight bonds of blood relationship, strong 
tradition of vendetta, and so forth. 
They neglected the experience of Russian Generals Aleksey Ermolov, Alexander 
Baryatinskii, Nikolay Evdokimov and others who acted not only skillfully, decisively, 
and cruelly, but who could treat their enemies respectfully. Alexander II met with 
captured Imam Shamil in St. Petersburg and treated him generously, providing him with a 
pension and a private mansion in the city ofKaluga. Later Shamil was even permitted to 
leave for Mecca. 
Two colonels from th-e Russian General Staff visited the State Military Historic 
Archive in Lefortovo at the end of November 1994 (!)with an official request from the 
Ministry of Defense to learn more about the historical context of the armed conflict in the 
North Caucasus. The archive officials were very enthusiastic that their assistance and 
expertise might help to sooner resolve the conflict in Chechnya and prevent future armed 
violence there. But the military limited their knowledge to mere general information 
which they could have found in any pre-Soviet encyclopedia. 16 
Regarding the combat experience of the Imperial Russian army in the Caucasus, 
Robert Baumann, an American researcher of the Caucasian war, observed, "From an 
13 E. Pain, A. Popov, "Rossiiskaya politika v Chechne: Diplomatiya pod kovrom" (Russia's Policy In 
Chechnya: The Under-Rug Diplomacy). lzvestiya, February 9, 1995, p. 4. 
14 L. Krutakov, "Two Presidents Follow One Path To War". Moskovskiye Novosti (Moscow News), 
February 3-9, 1995, No. 5, p. 2. 
15 Dudayev "inherited" with the help of General Grachev 42 MBTs (with 9,770 shells), 38 IFVs (12,000), 
28 APCs, 31,738 AKMs, 12,813 hand guns, 1,011 submachine guns, 1 ,021 rocket grenade launchers, 
8,654 artillery and mortar shells, 13,847 hand grenades, etc. See: A.Borovkov, "ChR: Komu i dlya 
chego ostavleno oruzhiye?" (Ch[echen]R[epublic]: For Whom And For What Purposes They Left The 
Arms?). Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), July 1, 1992, p. 2. 
16 V. Gromov, "Dom, gde razbivayntsya pamyatniki" (House Where Monuments Are Decrowned). 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russian Gazette), November 3, 1995, p. 27. 
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institutional perspective, no systematic effort was made to preserve and disseminate the 
lessons of the Caucasian theater, which had little relevance to European warfare ... "I 7 
If that assertion correctly applies to activities of such an outstanding personality 
as the nineteenth century Russian war minister (1861-1881) General Dmitriy Milyutin, it 
unfortunately corresponds even more accurately with the deeds of "the best Russian 
Minister of Defense of the last decade," as President Y eltsin characterized General 
Grachev. The cost of neglecting the Russian Caucasian army's experience in the last 
century turned out too high for the modern Russian troops engaged in Chechnya. 
(Though even the fact that the armed forces' units presented as a part of the elite 
Mobile Forces suffered a crushing defeat in Grozny did not discourage Minister Grachev, 
who demonstrated steadfast confidence that his dreams will come true. Grachev asserted 
that the total strength of the Mobile Forces would be 200,000 men.I 8 While inspecting 
troops in the Far Eastern Military district in September 1995, he declared that the local 
component of the mobile forces would be based on one of the assault battalions of the 
naval infantry division, Pacific Fleet, and that the formation of the Far Eastern arm of the 
mobile forces would be accomplished by the year 2000.I 9) 
Thirdly, the decision-makers in the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense failed to 
convince the Russian public of the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus in general and 
Chechnya in particular for Russian national security interests and of the necessity to 
preserve Chechnya as an integral part of Russia. They never tried to initiate wide public 
discussion of ways and methods to peacefully solve the problem to mutual satisfaction. 
Instead they launched a series of secret coercive moves and finally secretly decided on a 
full-scale invasion. 
General R. Fadeev, a prominent Russian nineteenth century military theorist, 
explained the security interests of the Russian empire in the Caucasus in the following 
terms: 
" ... [Russian] domination at the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, or at least 
the neutrality of these seas, is a vital issue for the entire southern half of 
Russia, from [the river] Oka to Crimea, where the major strength of the 
empire, both human and material, is more and more concentrated. . .. But 
Russia can guard its southern basins only from the Caucasian isthmus ... 
The sequence of water basins delving into the Asian mainland from the 
Dardanelles to the Aral Sea with its navigable tributary Amu River, cutting 
through entire central Asia almost up to the Indian border - is an 
I 7 Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan (Leavenworth Papers, No. 20, p. 35). 
I 8 N. Astashkin, V. Yermolin, "Mobilnyi sily na yuge Rossii sformirovany i gotovy reshat lyubyi zadachi" 
(Mobile Forces in Russia's South Are Fonned And Rea:iy To Solve Any Tasks). Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5, 
1994, p.]. 
I 9 0. Kryuchek, "Pavel Grachev ob'yavil o sozdanii mobilnykh sil tikhookeanskogo flota" (Pavel Grachev 
Announced About Formation of the Mobile Forces of the Pacific Fleet). Segodnya (Today), September 5, 
1995, p. 2. 
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extremely attractive trade route [for Europe], leading its way through 
roadless ridges and the highlands of Armenia and Azerbaijan . 
.. .In case some Europeans had established trade via internal Asian 
basins on their own, prior to or beyond our control in the Caucasus, that 
trade route could have set the limit of our relations with Asia. Everything 
behind the line running from the mouth of the Kuban River through the 
northern coast of the Aral Sea and farther on would have been united in a 
group adversarial to us; and our only gain would have been turning our 
whole southern boundary from Crimea to China into an actual frontier 
with forts and armed forces needed to guard it. 
... European trade with Persia and internal Asia conducted across 
the Russian-dominated Caucasian isthmus guarantees positive benefits to 
the state; if the same trade had been trafficked through a Caucasus which 
was independent of Russia, that could have created an endless chain of 
losses and threats for Russia. 
Almost the whole Russian history is a lasting Asian question since 
those old days when the first communities of Slavs started moving 
westward, superseding or absorbing Asian tribes. 
What is a matter of convenience and profit for' Western Europe, for 
Russia is a crucial matter. It relates to Asia as naturally as the United 
States related to America before breaking off. Russia could not stop 
neither in the Caucasus, nor in the Urals. Advance was more suitable than 
passive defense in an unfavorable position ... "20 
Of course it could be hard and probably unnecessary to apply a hundred year old 
imperial geopolitical rationale to the modem situation in Russia in general, and in 
Chechnya in particular. Though one potion is topical even today: "if the same [Europe-
Asia-Europe] trade had been trafficked through a Caucasus which was independent of 
Russia, that could have created an endless chain of losses and threats for Russia." The 
problem of the Caspian oil deposits (with a supposed output of 200-400 million tons per 
year) and especially of the possible pipe-line route (with the forecasted near- and long-
term dividends of correspondingly 1 and 5 to 10 billion dollars a year)21 is just one 
example of geostrategic importance of the North Caucasus and Chechnya. 
Such an explanation of the Caucasian focus of the Russian government's security 
concerns could sound even more persuasive if coupled, for example, with a foreign policy 
statement of one of the major candidates for the next president of the United States, 
Republican Senator Robert Dole, who declared that: 
20 R. A. Fadeev, "Shestdesyat let Kavkazskoi voiny. Pisma s Kavkaza" (Sixty Years of the Caucasian 
War. Letters From The Caucasus), Sobraniye sochinenii (StPetersburg, 1889. Vol. 1. Part 1. Pp. 5-7, 
241, 249). 
21 I. Sidorov, "Chechenskaya zadvizhka dlya milliarda dollarov" (Chechen Slide-Valve For A Billion 
Dollars) Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 3, 1995, p. 4. 
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"[T]he security of the world's oil and gas supplies remain a vital interest 
of the United States and its major allies. But its borders now move north, 
to include the Caucasus, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. Our forward military 
presence and diplomacy need adjusting. "22 
But the Kremlin did not put forward this argument to convince the Russian public 
of the urgent necessity to stop the criminal evolution of the secessionist republic. Almost 
no other arguments were used except the condemnation of the criminal nature of 
Dudayev's regime. The primary reason for officialdom to avoid open public discussion 
was an apprehension that society might demand a peaceful solution and break the rules of 
the power game of the Kremlin and "power ministries." 
The fourth blunder is closely related to the previous one. Russian political-
military leadership did not use all the peaceful means to resolve the problem. Instead its 
civilian part, represented by "intellectuals" (presidential assistants, analysts, and 
members of the whimsical - innocuous and unavailing - presidential council), 
unskillfully exercised the policy of "carrot and stick." They failed to propose to 
Dudayev a "carrot" big enough, so that he could not reject it (like they did in the case of 
Tatarstan). 
As to possible "carrots," the imperial Russian past provides instructive examples. 
One was prompted by the Chechen emigre-writer Abdourahman Avtorkhanov. In his 
memoirs A vtorkhanov quoted the proclamation to the peoples of Chechnya, signed on 
behalf of emperor Alexander II by a viceroy of the Caucasus General Field Marshal Prince 
Alexander Baryatinskii in 1859: 
"On behalf of His Majesty the Emperor, I proclaim: 
1) that the Russian government allows you forever to adhere absolutely 
freely to the faith of your forefathers; 
2) that you never will be recruited or turned to Cossackship; 
3) that for three years after the adoption of this act you are granted [tax] 
exemptions, while after this term you must pay for maintenance of your 
public administration 3 rubles per house. Aul [mountain village] 
communities will apportion the dues independently; 
4) that appointed authorities will rule by Shari a ... , while justice and 
prosecution will be executed in public courts, composed of the best 
people elected by you and appointed by the authorities; 
22 Martin Walker, "Caspian Oil and Pipeline Diplomacy." The Moscow Times, September 29, 1995, p. 8. 
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S) that your rights of property will be kept inviolable. Your land estates, 
both hereditary or apportioned by the Russian authorities, will be 
allotted to your inherent possession by laws and plans ... " 
"If the modem 'autonomous' Checheno-Ingush Republic had such a 
constitution," summarized Avtorkhanov, "I would consider it as a super-
happy state. ,m 
While this "party of peace" continued its feeble attempts, the "party of war" 
represented by strong supporters of the forceful solution - "power ministers," members 
of the Security Council, assisted by "uniformed civilians" (like deputy ministers for 
nationalities' affairs and regional politics Generals Alexander Kotenkov and Kim 
Tsagolov, et. al.) and civilian "hawks" (like Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhrai, 
former minister and now presidential adviser for nationalities' affairs and regional politics 
Nikolay Yegorov) - secretly supported and armed Dudayev's local opponents and 
refused to deal with Dudayev himself. More than that, every time it seemed that Grozny 
might agree to Moscow's terms, the "power ministries" have repeatedly taken measures 
to undermine any possibility of a negotiated settlement. 
The fifth misdeed of Y eltsin' s political-military establishment displays its "blood 
relationship" with the last Soviet administration of Gorbachev. Almost in the same way 
as the Soviets did after Afghanistan, Tbilisi, Vilnius, etc., the "democratic" Russian 
government shifted the blame for its own political faults to the armed forces. 
At first, the Chechen opposition and deceived Russian mercenaries, backed up and 
instigated by Deputy Premier Sergei Shakhrai and by Chief of the Federal 
Counterintelligence Service Sergei Stepashin, carried out a series of abortive armed 
attempts to overthrow Dudayev. But when the mercenaries were captured as prisoners 
of war and the news was disclosed to the Russian public, the "power ministers" managed 
to persuade the president, who was not at all adverse to the idea of armed "elimination" 
of the problem called "Dzhokhar Dudayev," to intervene militarily in full scale. 
Though it is obvious that the idea of involving the armed forces in the Chechen 
crisis resolution was long cherished by the "power structures," it very soon turned out 
that in fact neither Grachev's military nor Y erin's interior forces were ready for such a 
"police" operation. Grachev, Yerin, and Stepashin let their soldiers die in hundreds in an 
unprepared combat without clear objectives. 
After Shamil Basayev's terrorist blackmail victory, the military discovered that all 
the results of their self-sacrificing fierce fighting were once again lost by politicians. 
Thus, many military officers became convinced of political and social malfeasance -
sending the army to Chechnya (like before to Afghanistan) but withdrawing support 
when things went wrong, leaving the military to "hold the bag." 
23 A. Avtorkhanov, "Iz biografii moyego naroda" (From The Biografy Of My People). Novoye Vremya 
(The New Times), September 29, 1995, p. 8. 
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Besides, the unpopular, bloody and dirty Chechen war, combined with the April 
1993 cancellation of practically all legal exemptions from military conscription, which 
affected primarily youths from middle-class families, led to a new, high wave of anti-
military sentiments in Russian society. 
Finally, the Chechen adventure of the decision-makers from the Kremlin, Staraya 
Square, Arhat Square, Lubyanka Square, and Oktyabrskaya Square24 have exposed to the 
whole world, not just Russia's friends, that the Russian leadership and armed forces 
cannot resolve militarily even a limited conflict. 
* * * 
A systemic crisis of civil-military relations is unfolding in Russia at three levels: in 
the upper echelons ofstate power, in·the military, and in society. 
At the national government level the Chechen war activated several conflicts. The 
,most important one is a latent struggle for the right to control the military and law-
enforcement policies between the president himself (counseled and directed by his 
security entourage) and other branches of power - the prime minister, Security Council, 
and parliament. 
The president unilaterally deprived parliament of most of the legislative 
provisions for civilian oversight of the military after October 4, 1993 - first by his 
constitution, and then by his decree on December 21, 1993. That is why the State 
Duma's attempts to put the course of the military operation in Chechnya under 
legislative control failed. 
Highly significant was a clash between the Duma's Defense Committee Chairman 
Sergey Yushenkov and the Duma's former human rights representative Sergey Kovalyov 
(both representing Russia's Choice), opposing the war in Chechnya on the one side, and 
Minister of Defense Pa:Vel Grachev on the other side. The details of their confrontation 
were accurately described in mass media. That collision had meaningful results: while the 
Duma democratic deputies won a moral victory, they did not succeed in stopping the 
war. At the same time Grachev not only resisted their criticism and continued a 
catastrophic military operation, but also survived its disastrous results. 
It was once again the tragedy in Budyonnovsk that helped the parliament and 
intellectuals in the president's office to decisively call to account the "power ministers." 
However, soon after the "party of peace" started to celebrate the resignations of the 
"heroes" of the Chechen war they discovered that their main target, Defense Minister 
Grachev, had skipped out intact. 
While Grachev's conflict with Russia's Choice was an open one, his behind the 
scenes struggle against Prime Minister Chemomyrdin's control revealed itself only 
occasionally. Obviously, Chemomyrdin had nothing to do with the real decision-making 
on the start of the police operation in Chechnya. The first time that Chemomyrdin 
24 Places of residence of the president, Security Council, Ministry of Defense, Federal Counterintelligence 
Service (currently- Federal Security Service), and Ministry oflnterior. 
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managed to get the power structures under temporary control was the Budyonnovsk 
crisis. He did what the "party of peace" in the Presidential Administration could not 
accomplish: he stopped the war and renewed negotiations. 
Today we are facing the second time that Viktor Chemomyrdin's authority over 
the power agencies is openly challenged by the defense minister. On Friday night, 
November 3, major Russian television companies broadcast news of the partial transfer of 
the president's responsibilities to the prime minister as a result of Yeltsin's decision 
while recuperating from heart trouble at the government hospital in Kuntsevo. But that 
very day at the meeting of the heads of the CIS governments, Grachev announced to the 
media that he is subordinated "directly to the president of Russia." According to 
Grachev, he deals with Chemomyrdin only in "military-economic matters."25 
It was very telling that Boris Yeltsin's escape from public view on the pretext of 
nasal surgery on the eve of intervention in Chechnya coincided with an unexpected, 
unexplainable disappearance of the president's national security adviser Yury Baturin. 
When questioned about his strange behavior, Baturin rebutted charges against him of 
keeping silent on the war in Chechnya, saying ": .. [S]ince early 1994, when I became the 
assistant [to the president] on national security, I have been dealing with the classified 
data which was seldom inter-related with open information. .. .I believe that it is 
inappropriate to hold public discussion of the particulars now. Later- yes, certainly."26 
It is no secret for defense and security analysts in Moscow that Baturin's relations with 
Defense Minister Grachev are strained, so most observers commented on the serious 
victory of the pro-military lobby in the Presidential entourage over Yeltsin's civilian 
assistants in the question of the Chechen crisis resolution. 
On the level of the military itself, the crisis of civil-military relations was 
manifested in the desperate desire of the military to establish their own lobby in the 
parliament in an attempt to am~ct the national government. Today 123 uniformed 
Grachev loyalists are running for public office. However, not all the military candidates 
are Grachev's supporters. Some of them opposed the policies of the minister of defense 
and resigned in protest. Now they figure prominently on the lists of several major 
electoral blocs (Aleksandr Lebed of the Congress of Russian Communities, Eduard 
Vorobyov of the Russia's Choice, etc.). Others in uniform are either Grachev's open 
opponents (like Boris Gromov of the "My Fatherland" bloc) or his moderate critics (like 
one of the most prominent Russian commanders of the Chechen war, General Lev 
Rokhlin of Chemomyrdin' s Our Home Is Russia, who has declined to be awarded the 
Hero of Russia military decoration on the grounds that a military officer cannot be 
decorated for taking part in a civil conflict, or Y evgeny Podkolzin, Commander in Chief of 
the airborne troops, of the "For the Motherland" bloc). 
25 I. Korotchenko, "Pavel Grachev: Moi nachalnik- tolko Yeltsin" (Pavel Grachev: My Chief Is Yeltsin 
Only). Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 4, 1995, p. 2. 
26 Yu. Zainashev, "Predstaviteli Yeltsina hoteli schitat tsyplyat po oseni" (Yeltsin's representatives 
wanted to count their chickens when they were hatched [literally- in autumn]). Moskovskii 
Komsomo/ets, July 27, 1995, p. 2. 
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It-would be a mistake to see this as a military coup by stealth. The army is a 
deeply divided organization, as the war in Chechnya has proved. The generals confirm 
this by running for political office with parties representing different parts of political 
spectrum. The Duma is not a good launching pad for seizing power other than by 
democratic electoral means. General Lebed put it best with his customary brevity when 
he said: "Fear the generals who are not running for the Duma." 
As Thomas de Waal, a columnist of the Moscow Times newspaper, accurately 
observed: 
"Sergey Yushenkov, the excellent reformist chairman of the 
[Duma] Defense Committee, is unlikely to hang on to his job after 
December. Who replaces him will be very important. If it is Lebed, the 
results could be interesting. If it is ... [General Valentin] Varennikov [one 
of the leaders of the unsuccessful hard-line coup in August 1991], Western 
strategists should start taking a few Cold War treatises from their shelves." 
The evolution of the relationship between the Russian Ministry of Defense and 
the Russian mass media mirrors the crisis of civil-military relations at the societal level in 
general. 
The introduction and support of freedom of speech was an indisputable credit of 
perestroika and Gorbachev' s greatest achievement, the importance and long-term effect of 
which had never been exceeded by any of Boris Y eltsin's undertakings. It was due to 
glasnost that an active public discussion of the problems of defense policies, military 
reforms, and civil-military relations started. That debate involved not only party and 
military officials, but a great number of civilian defense analysts as well. For the first 
time in Soviet history, such a public dialogue was becoming free of ideological dogmas and 
attracting the lively interest of a broad audience. At the same time, during the Gorbachev 
era for the first time in the Soviet history, the military complained about being insulted 
and criticized, both as a social institution and as individuals, by society and particularly 
the free mass media. 
During Yeltsin's term of office the new Russian military leadership tried to learn 
how to deal with the free mass media. However, several events of the last two years 
ruined Minister Grachev's and his ministry's relations with the mass media. 
Firstly, journalists criticized the military for their role in the fighting between the 
President and the Supreme Soviet in October 1993. Then, the mass media accused 
Grachev's military of voting for Zhirinovskii in the December 1993 State Duma elections. 
Next came the scandalous campaign of sharp criticism in the media against Grachev 
himself and his closest aids at the Ministry of Defense in connection with the 
assassination of a Moscow newspaper correspondent who investigated the "generals' 
case" of large-scale corruption in the armed forces. In response, Grachev attacked media 
treatment of the issue of corruption within the military as a "political provocation" aimed 
at undermining the armed forces and the authority of the Russian state. He even 
compared that criticism of the top military to the past persecution of Jews by Stalin: 
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"Once we had the doctors' plot, now it's the generals' plot." He added, "Beat the 
generals, save Russia," an obvious paraphrase of the old Russian anti-Semitic slogan 
"Beat the Yids, save Russia." 
Public criticism of the Chechen campaign arose before the first civilian and 
military casualties came. The media criticized the ·political-military leadership for its 
chosen option of conflict resolution. The main reason for sharp criticism was not just the 
character of that option - a full-scale armed intervention in Chechnya - but the ways 
and methods of making the final decision. It was done in the worst Soviet-style tradition 
of total secrecy and mass deception. Pavel Grachev, together with his colleagues from the 
other power ministries, Stepashin and Yerin, deliberately lied about the Russian military 
officers' involvement in Chechnya on the side of anti-Dudayev opposition. Even later, 
when those mercenaries were captured by Dudayev' s forces and their semi-interviews or 
semi-interrogations were televised by the Chechens, Grachev refused to recognize their 
affiliation with his ministry. 
Further events proved that total secrecy was chosen as the main method of 
handling the Chechen crisis. Grachev (definitely on Yeltsin's authorization) kept in the 
dark not only Russia's lawmakers, the public and the mass media, but his ministerial staff 
as well. A~ former Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Boris Gromov disclosed, 
"[T]he operation [in Chechnya] was prepared in great secrecy and I did not know 
anything about it.'m Gromov characterized such secretiveness as the general trend 
within the Russian defense establishment. 
"Over the past two and a half years [of ~he existence of the 
Russian Ministry of Defense, May 1992 - January 1995] the work of the 
Collegium [of the Ministry of Defense] has become a formality," said 
Gromov. "The crucial decisions affecting the future of the nation are 
increasingly being made by a limited number of officials. In fact, the 
Collegium was barred from the discussion of problems connected with the 
START II treaty, the Partnership for Peace program, and other documents 
of great importance to the Defense Ministry. The decision on using the 
armed forces in Chechnya was also made secretly and was not discussed 
by the board. "28 
Thus, Pavel Grachev' s Chechen campaign totally ruined the Ministry of 
Defense's relations with the democratic mass media. But the top military officers stood 
up staunchly to defend their minister. For instance, Commander of the Moscow military 
district Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov was quoted as saying that he "would shoot 
... those rascals who are slandering our minister of defense."29 
27 A. Zhilin, "Chechnya Plans Kept From Deputy Defense Minister." The Moscow News, No.2, January 
13-19, 1995, p. 1. 
28 Ibid. 
29 K. Lyubarskii, "Sovershenno sekretno" (Top Secret). Novoye Vremya (New Times), No. 19-20, May 
1995, p. 19. 
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So, today the Russian Ministry of Defense has a mostly confrontational 
relationship with the mass media. The Ministry of Defense-controlled newspaper 
Krasnaya Zvezda and several military journals accused journalists of an anti-military and 
anti-army stance, of corruption, and ofpro-Dudaev sympathies. 
In reality, Russian journalists again feel the public interest and concern regarding 
the problems of the Russian military and of their democratic reforms. In the nearest 
future we may face a revived debate of these questions reminiscent of the high point of 
the del!locratic wave of the Gorbachev era. It may be even more interesting and important 
not only for Russia, because in the following several months Russia will hold two 
electoral campaigns, which will significantly change anyway the situation within the 
Russian military and society. 
35 
Chapter Three 
The Chechen Campaign 
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer 
Defense and Security Editor 
Segodnya 
When in mid December 1994 the Russian army suddenly marched on Grozny, not only 
the general public in Russia, but many politicians and analysts in Moscow and world 
wide were caught unawares. This sudden and ill-prepared winter march seemed totally 
irrational. But politicians, journalists, analysts and other "Gurus in Residence" must 
deliver explanations even if they are as baffled by events as the general public is, an 
occupational hazard of a profession that most of the time provides an easy and reasonable 
income with lots of personal ego satisfaction on the side. 
The most intelligent way to react publicly to an unpredictable situation and to avoid 
tarnishing one's "Guru in Residence" credentials is to use the method of historical 
similarity. There was a long and bitter war between Russians and Chechens last century, 
so the new encounter may be described as the Second Caucasian War. 
The Long History Of Russian-Chechen Warfare 
There really are striking similarities between the wars then and now: battles on the Argun, 
for Vedeno and near Darga; the severity of the fighting; the heavy loses, including very 
many civilians; the rules of engagement used by both sides that are obviously not in 
accord with civilized customs of warfare. As a result, many an analyst believed that the 
conflict would indeed turn out to be a second edition of the Great Caucasian War. When 
the Russian army got bogged down battling the Chechens in the winter of 1995 and took 
four whole months of heavy fighting in Grozny and on the plains just to reach the 
mountains, it was universally predicted that there, on the cliffs and in the ravines, the 
gallant guerrillas could make a stand, and that the ungainly Russian armored columns 
would be even less effective than on the streets of Grozny. The anti-Russian guerrilla 
war would go on and on, spreading from tribe to tribe throughout the Caucasus, as it did 
last century. Many even predicted that Russia had already lost the war and was on the 
verge of plunging into a long period of destructive internal turmoil like some Third World 
country. 
But historical analogies are often misleading. After almost a year of conflict the 
Caucasian nations seem even more calm and unwilling to revolt against Moscow than at 
the beginning of the war. Also, in the old mountain strongholds of Vedeno and Shatoi the 
Chechens fared much worse in May and June 1995 than in Grozny in January. The 
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strategic situation in the Caucasus is totally different today than in the last century. The 
mountainous people of the Caucasus no longer live in self-sufficient communities. They 
cannot produce their own arms and munitions in high mountain hideouts to fight the 
Russians face to face. They cannot even feed themselves. Without massive trade with 
Russian-inhabited lands and massive help and subsidies from the government in Moscow, 
not a single Caucasian nation can physically survive. 
Nonetheless, the call ofhistory is still important. In the Soviet times the authorities 
in Moscow did their best to keep the general public ignorant of the long and bloody war 
in the mountains in the last century. The official motive was to perpetuate the myth that 
all the tribes and nations of the Soviet Union joined Russia voluntarily and with glee. That 
was all a good Soviet officer needed to know. Serious military, political and ethno-social 
research of that war and its aftermath was virtually forbidden. As a result, the Russians 
have virtually forgotten the Caucasian war of the last century. And so they made many 
of the same mistakes as they made 150 years ago. The Russian forces often assumed a 
reactive posture, failing to consistently and aggressively engage the Chechens. The 
decision-making and command structure of the Russian forces was confused. The 
Russian military, intelligence and political leaders grossly underestimated the Chechens' 
resolve to fight and the degree of hostility that a Russian military move into Chechnya 
would create. The Russian army marched into a conflict as unprepared and ignorant of 
the task ahead of it as their nineteenth century predecessors -- those bayonet and saber 
brandishing, post-Napoleonic, dandied infantry and cavalry men. 
But the Chechens forgot nothing. Not the war itself, not the gallantry of Imam 
Shamil's men, not the savagery of the fighting and the scorched land tactics of General 
Aleksei Ermolov and other Caucasian viceroys. And, of course, the Chechens did not 
forget the 1944 brutal deportation of all their nation by Soviet (Russian) troops. But the 
Chechen recollections of the last century Caucasian war were very romantic. They, 
apparently, actually believed that the irresolute Russians would simply flee when 
confronted with real Chechen valor, and thus invested very little effort into long-term 
planning and organization. 
During virtually all of the 1995 campaign30 the Chechens lacked the concentration and 
coordination of force needed to inflict any but minor defeats on the Russians. Just as in 
the pre-Shamil times of their anti-Russian resistance last century, the "mountaineers were 
so deficient in conducting offensive operations more complex than an ordinary raid that 
the Russians considered a detachment of several companies sufficient to constitute an 
independent force. The mountaineers repeatedly proved unable to defeat a disciplined 
formation and showed no capacity whatsoever to cope effectively with artillery. "31 
Whereas the great Imam Shamil created a stringent political-economic system that enabled 
him to conduct a prolonged and effective campaign, Dudayev's Chechnya-Ichkeriya 
30with the exception of fighting in Grozny on January 1-3, 1995 
31 Leavenworth Papers, N 20, "Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan by R.F. Baumann", p.1l. 
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collapsed militarily after several months of fighting. Even such a span of effective 
resistance in the field was mostly the result of Russian strategic, operational and tactical 
blunders. 
The mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus may think of themselves as direct 
descendants oflmam Shamil's Murids who followed their leader unquestioningly. But in 
reality the social and economic structure of the Caucasian tribes has changed dramatically 
and the independent Chechnya-Ichkeriya ofDzhokar Dudayev was definitely no Imamat. 
Thus the method of historical parallelism is rather misleading when analyzing the present 
Chechen conflict. 
The Independent Chechnya-Ichkeriya Of Dzhokar Dudayev 
(1991-1994) 
The self-proclaimed republic of Chechnya-Ichkeriya unilaterally declared its 
independence in 1991, after the Congress of the Chechen Nation overthrew the 
government of the Chechen-Ingush republic and forcibly disbanded its Supreme Soviet 
headed by former Communist Party Chief and Chechen strong-man Doku Zavgayev.32 
In October 1991, after dislodging Zavgayev, taking over local KGB and Interior Ministry 
headquarters and freeing criminals from local prisons, the armed pro-independence 
supporters of the Chechen Nation's Congress organized unconstitutional parliamentary 
and presidential elections that made their declared leader, former Soviet Air Force General 
Dzhokar Dudayev, the president of a sovereign and independent Chechnya-Ichkeriya 
republic. 
The authorities in Moscow never recognized Dudayev and his self-proclaimed 
independent lchkeriya. In November 1991, several weeks after the unilateral declaration 
of Chechen independence, Russian President Boris Y eltsin proclaimed martial law in 
Chechnya in an attempt to quell General Dzhokar Dudayev's secessionist revolt before it 
became really dangerous. 
But Mikhail Gorbachev, then still formally president of a collapsing Soviet Union and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, ordered the army to remain strictly neutral 
and to take no part whatsoever in enforcing the martial law. This order to keep out of 
mischief was willingly passed to the troops in and around Grozny by then-Chief of Staff 
General Vladimir Lobov.33 A regiment oflightly armed Interior Ministry troops that had 
been airlifted into Grozny surrendered its arms to the Chechen rebels without a fight 
when it became clear that the army would not support them. 
32 In October 1995 Zavgayev, who spent almost 4 years in exile in Moscow working as an official in the 
administration of President Yeltsin, was appointed prime minister of the Russian-backed, Grozny-based 
National Revival Government of Chechnya. 
33 According to what Lobov told me -in December 1991. 
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The Russian Supreme Soviet promptly overruled Yeltsin's martial-law decree. The 
Chechen secessionist movement was allowed to develop until it got totally out of control 
and war became more or less inevitable. In 1991 Russian society and the majority of the 
political elite regarded the use of armed force as totally unacceptable in any situation. 
Never since, in any negotiations, did the Chechens believe that the Russian 
government was capable and willing to use force to subdue their secession. During the 
war in 1995 they were reluctant to enter any meaningful negotiations, regardless of the 
pounding they were getting in the fighting. The Chechens were waiting for the Russian 
morale to crack, for the total victory and final triumph of the Chechen side. Many 
Chechen resistance field commanders even considered the Russian-Chechen military 
accord, signed in Grozny of July 30, 1995, as only a face-saving maneuver for the Russian 
army to withdraw its forces without officially acknowledging total defeat. The Chechens, 
obviously, do not believe that the Russian Armed Forces are capable of winning any 
armed conflict. 
They had a very good reason to think so. After the disastrous November 1991 
attempt to subdue the Chechen secession, the Y eltsin administration was too preoccupied 
fighting the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, headed by another well-known and influential 
Chechen, Ruslan Khasbulatov, to be able to maintain any credible forceful policy in 
dealings with Dudayev. Since legislative support for any military action in Chechnya was 
not forthcoming, the situation was more or less left to simmer in the hope that it would 
somehow solve itself. 
In June 1992 the Russian authorities withdrew all Russian defense personnel and their 
families from Chechnya. Almost all the arms and military equipment of Russian army 
units in Chechnya were left behind. This included, according to semi-official estimates: 
42 tanks (T-62M and T-72); 66 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) - BMP-1, BMP-2, 
BTP-70, BRDM-2; 30 122mm towed howitzers D-30; 58 120mm PM-38 mortars; 18 B-
21 Grad MRLs; 523 RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers and 77 ATGW (Concurs, Fagot 
and Metis); 18,832 AK-74, 9307 AK-47 (AKM), 533 sniper rifles, 1160 machine-guns; 4 
ZCU-23-4 Shilka, 6 ZU-23 and an unspecified number of Igla portable SAMs; 152 
Czech-made L-39 trainer-bomber jets, 94 L-29, several Mig-15, Mig-17, An-2 airplanes 
and 2 Mi-8 helicopters. 
The arms could not have been recovered without a major military operation, since the 
cadre (skeleton) units based in Chechnya could not defend themselves. But a major 
invasion of Chechnya, to free the besieged Russian garrisons and to organize a withdrawal 
of the armaments and the men, would have certainly led to armed clashes and loss of life. 
Such action would have been extremely unpopular in Russia, would have almost certainly 
been condemned by the Supreme Soviet and maybe even used to initiate a successful 
impeachment procedure to oust President Boris Y eltsin. So no one in the administration 
dared to provoke an armed clash in Chechnya with uncertain results. Therefore a tacit 
agreement was reached that allowed the Russian servicemen and their families to 
withdraw peacefully and Dudayev to get the arms. 
This tacit agreement clearly followed the pattern of other Russian Armed Forces 
withdrawals from the former Soviet republics. In 1992 the Russian army was used to 
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cutting its losses and retreating. But this time it happened on sovereign, internationally 
recognized Russian territory. However, in 1992, only several months after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the difference between former Soviet and Russian 
territory was in no way clear. Emotionally a great number of Russian officers did not see 
any difference. But the politicians, who should have known better, just shoved the 
problem onto the military to blunder through on their own. 
While the legislature and administration in Moscow were locked in battle, the heavily 
armed and semi-independent Chechnya-Ichkeriya of Dzhokar Dudayev developed into a 
strange buccaneer republic, a source of illicit arms and drug trafficking into Russia and a 
safe haven for any common criminal. In 1993 General Dudayev used armed force to 
disband the Chechen parliament and since then ruled in Grozny as an authoritarian 
Lebanese-style warlord, his control over the majority of small Chechen towns and the 
countryside being nominal or nonexistent. 
The civil airstrip north of Grozny developed into a unofficial international airport 
with up to 150 foreign-bound charter flights a month, mostly to Turkey. There were, 
obviously, no Russian government customs or passport controls, which made it a safe 
haven for smuggling. Official authorities still considered Chechnya an integral part of 
Russia, so the traffic through the secessionist republic was virtually unhampered, 
especially through Ingushetia. 
It is often alleged that certain influential people in Moscow actively participated in 
large scale bank fraud and illegal oil export operations conducted through Grozny. It is 
also alleged that the Chechens actively bribed high-ranking Moscow officials and that this 
explains the obvious leniency of the Kremlin in dealings with Dudayev's illegal and 
corrupt regime. 
But in the end basic Russian strategic and national security interests prevailed. The 
only railroad linking Russia with the Transcaucasus, which is of great strategic and 
economic importance was virtually blocked because it passes right through Chechnya. In 
addition, several important oil and natural gas pipelines that go through the secessionist 
republic also became unreliable. Because many influential Russian businessmen and 
bankers are extremely interested in developing economic ties with Azerbaijan, and in view 
of the Russian effort to channel Azery Caspian oil through Russian territory, the pressure 
to restore order in Chechnya was steadily increasing. 
Since the failed November 1991 attempt to stop the Chechen mutiny, there have been 
many attempts to solve the problem through negotiation. Several times an agreement 
seemed almost inevitable. But time and again Dudayev blocked negotiations or denounced 
agreements. At the same time, Chechnya-Ichkeriya was obviously disintegrating, with 
warlords big and small taking over districts, towns and villages. As the anarchy increased, 
clans and large families formed armed groups to defend themselves and to harass the 
neighborhood, if need be. As a result there was a growing number of low-scale inter-
Chechen armed clashes since late 1993. 
The situation was becoming increasingly intolerable. Chechnya seemed to be in total 
disorder and fragmentation. General Dudayev was too weak and out of control to 
negotiate with and, for that same reason, ripe for an easy overthrow. 
40 
The Covert Operation To Overthrow Dudayev, 1994 
After the Y eltsin administration and its supporters successfully used armed force to 
subdue the Russian legislature in October 1993, several high-ranking officials decided that 
the time to solve "the Chechen problem" had come. By mid-1994 it was decided to begin 
a covert operation to overthrow Dudayev, using the same tactics that were so successful 
in Abkhazia in 1993, where the Russian army unofficially supported the Abkhaz rebels 
by providing them with some arms and also firepower, air power and logistical support. 
Originally, the idea to use the Chechen opposition to overthrow Chechen President 
Dzhokar Dudayev came from Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakhrai. General Aleksandr 
Kotenkov, Deputy Nationalities Minister and a senior member of Shakhrai's political 
faction, took on the practical task of supplying money and weapons to the opposition. 
Obviously, Shakhrai and Kotenkov had been given approval by President Boris 
Yeltsin. They supplied the "united Chechen opposition" with considerable quantities of 
arms and cash. Later, Russian Mi-24 "unidentified" attack helicopters began flying close 
support combat sorties to help the opposition. But even this failed to bring results. Two 
attempts to blockade and storm the Chechen capital Grozny, at the end of August and 
again in mid-October, ended in failure. The rag-tag Chechen opposition gladly took the 
money and the arms, but never had any serious intention of risking their lives for the sake 
of Moscow's interests. 
In October, Shakhrai lost control of the secret operation in Chechnya. A new attack 
on Grozny was planed and organized by the Federal Counterintelligence Service, and 
overall control was passed on to Nationalities Minister Nikolai Yegorov. Allegedly, the 
powerful chief of President Yeltsin's security service, Aleksandr Korzhakov, was also 
involved. The Chechen opposition was provided not only with Russian tanks but with 
active duty Russian officers as well. 
However, during the November 26, 1994 attack on Grozny, opposition fighters again 
fled. The tanks with Russian officer crews were left exposed without infantry support 
on the streets of the capital and forced to surrender. After that, Yeltsin was left with no 
choice but to send the regular army into Chechnya. 
Only a full-scale operation in Chechnya could prevent an investigation of the previous 
covert missions. Apparently, the administration has already achieved this goal. A year 
later, after all the fighting and carnage in and around Chechnya, even the harshest critics of 
President Y eltsin and his administration have virtually forgotten the blundered covert 
operations in August-November 1994. Besides, on December 13, 1994, the Duma passed 
a resolution granting amnesty to all participants in the events in the Caucasus, apparently 
including even the highest levels of the administration and Yeltsin himself. In this respect 
the war has fully achieved its aim. 
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The Russian Army Moves On December 11,1994 
Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev has publicly acknowledged that 
the planning ofthe Chechen operation started only one month before "D" day. And these 
could have been only very tentative plans, since all in Moscow were awaiting the 
successful outcome ofthe last attempt to take Grozny using covert means on November 
26, 1994. The political decision to go into Chechnya was finally made on November 29, 
1994, after the extent of the November 26 disaster had become apparent. After that, the 
staff of the North-Caucasian Military District (NCMD) was given orders to plan and 
prepare the operation. First orders to begin force concentration were actually issued only 
in early December 1994, a week before "D" day.34 
By December 11, 1994 a task force ofNCMD, Interior Ministry (MVD) and mobile 
force airborne units was loosely assembled at bases in Mozdok, Beslan and Vladikavkaz. 
It consisted of23,700 men (19,000 Army, 4,700 MVD), 80 tanks, 208 ACVs, and 182 
guns and mortars. The enemy armaments at the beginning of the Chechen campaign were 
later officially estimated by the Russian defense ministry at 98 tanks, over 150 ACV s and 
up to 300 guns and mortars.35 
This enemy heavy armament assessment at the beginning of the campaign is 
approximately two times bigger than the estimates of arms left by the Russian army in 
Chechnya. This can be in part explained by the Chechen resistance taking over a large 
part of the equipment the Russians gave to the Chechen "united opposition". But mostly 
it is apparently the result of the Russian military's deliberate overestimation of enemy 
capabilities to explain its own blunders. Privately, high-ranking Russian generals agree 
that the bulk of the heavy armaments that the Chechen fighters used in battle was 
precisely the equipment the Russian army had left them. 
In any case, the Russian military command failed to concentrate an "overwhelming" 
force that could have melted away organized Chechen resistance. 
The Chechen campaign should have been a showcase of rapid deployment and success 
by Grachev's mobile forces, but it turned into a disaster. Low manpower in the Russian 
army has reduced all tank and motorized-rifle divisions to near cadre state so they can not 
be used in combat operations as whole units. The Russian armored columns that moved 
on Grozny on December 11, 1994, were in essence salami-style combined task forces 
hurriedly put together from small bits and pieces of different army and airborne units. 
Many of the soldiers had never fought or trained together because the Russian army, for 
lack of funds, has held no large maneuvers in the last three years. The Chechen fighters 
were much better motivated and knew the country they were fighting in. 
Understaffed and undertrained tank and mechanized units often suffered heavy losses. 
At the same time mobile paratroopers often refused to attack enemy strongholds in their 
34 Pavel Grachev, in Komsomo/'skaya Pravda, 28 July, 1995, p.4. 
35 Grachev's official statement at February 28, 1995 Chechen operation assessment meeting in the Defense 
Ministry in Moscow. Nezavisimaya Gaze/a, March 1, p.l. 
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airborne, aluminum-armored light tanks. In December 1994 and January 1995, Grachev's 
mobile force dream of a single airborne regiment capturing Grozny in two hours went 
sour. 
There was no pressing military necessity for the Russian army to march into 
Chechnya in December 1994 so unprepared and at the wrong time of year, when fog and 
low clouds hampered effective air support. There was time to prepare an offensive, since 
the Chechens possessed no capabilities to march to Moscow and to win a battle for the 
Kremlin while the Russian army was preparing to go into Grozny. But General Grachev, 
under attack in the press for alleged corruption, would not stop the operation and risk his 
position when many in the Kremlin believed that the Dudayev regime would collapse 
when the first Russian tank hits the streets of Grozny. Maybe Grachev himself believed 
in such an outcome. 
Marching On Grozny In December, 1994 
Elements of the 76th airborne division, the 21st airborne brigade and the 19th 
Vladikavkaz-based motorized-rifle division moved into Chechnya from the Beslan and 
Vladikavkaz bases through Ingushetia. The march was hampered by local anti-Russian 
Ingush demonstrations. The morale of the troops was low; they were unprepared for 
action and did not understand why they were being sent into battle. When the columns 
reached Chechen territory their progress was also impeded by the Chechen armed 
resistance, mostly various types of irregular units. 36 
Chechen fighters attempted to organize night-time partisan raids to stop the advance 
of the Russian columns, but these attacks were poorly planned and the Russian soldiers 
were able to fend them off. However, the advance of the western columns was slow. 
The most effective Chechen action in December was a surprise Grad MRL attack on 
an advance column of ACV s of the 1 06th airborne division and 56th airborne brigade near 
Dolinskoe that killed 6 officers (including 2 colonels) and 13 enlisted men.37 
The advance of troops in the north was much more efficient than through Ingushetia. 
Elements of the 8th Guards Corps from Volgograd, under General Lev Rokhlin' s 
command, and the ill-fated 131 st Maykop-based motorized-rifle brigade sped through 
territory controlled by anti-Dudayev forces from Isherskaya up to Chervlenaia, taking 
control of the railroad and important bridges on the Terek river, the only significant 
water-way obstacle for troop movement in this region. 
Unhampered by hostile civilian demonstrators and meeting very little armed 
opposition, the Russian troops crossed the Terek at several points, forged their way 
through the low ridge of hills known as the "Terski" mountains and began to descend on 
36 In Chechnya, every clan and village has its own armed formation with no other loyalties. 
3 7 Grachev's official statement at February 28, 1995, Chechen operation assessment meeting in the Defense 
Ministry in Moscow. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March I, p.2. 
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Grozny, semi-encircling the enemy stronghold from north-west to north-east. There they 
encountered growing resistance from Chechen formations. 
The first objective of the operation -- to block Grozny in preparation of a final assault 
on Dudayev -- was not accomplished. The Northern army group was still struggling to 
reach the outskirts of the city, while the Western task force was bogged down ten miles 
away. Only the Russian Air Force took advantage of several days of clear weather in 
early December and, according to Air Force Commander-in-Chief General Petr Deynekin, 
totally destroyed all Chechen airplanes on the airstrips near Grozny -- not only the 
hundreds of trainer jets that belonged to a former military flying school, but also six Tu-
134s and other civilian aircraft (in sum, over 250 planes). 
Russian officers and generals were reluctant to go into serious combat, being unsure of 
the possible political ramifications of massive losses of servicemen and civilians. They 
obviously feared that public protest could forever destroy their military careers. So on 
December 21, 1994, days after the start of campaign, General Grachev stormed into 
Mozdok to chew out the Russian officers and to get things going again. 
The commander of the NCMD, three-star general Colonel General Aleksei Mitukhin 
who had been in charge of the operation was pronounced "ill" with back problems on 
December 18, flown to Moscow to a hospital for treatment and later dismissed from 
service. The deputy commander of the NCMD Lieutenant General Todorov (in charge of 
the slow-advancing Western army group), the NCMD chief of staff and other NCMD 
high-ranking officers also was dismissed. 
Colonel General Eduard Vorobyov, first deputy commander of the Russian Ground 
Forces, on December 17 arrived in Mozdok, where the operational staff was based, and 
took over command ofthe operation on December 18 "on a temporary basis," as he said 
later. Talking to reporters on January 26, 1995, he said that "after studying the situation" 
he reported to the Chief of General Staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov, that "the 
operation is unprepared and can not be executed because of deficiencies in means and 
forces." He said that "according to army intelligence reports, Dudayev's units outnumber 
the Russian forces, the improvised "combined" regiments and brigades arriving for battle 
from different military districts are totally not battle worthy, and bad weather reports 
mean that constant and effective air support for the troops was virtually impossible." So 
further offensive action should be postponed. 
On December 20, General Grachev phoned Vorobyov and officially asked him to take 
over command of the Chechen operation and to continue the advance, Vorobyov refused. 
On December 21, at a meeting of staff in Mozdok General Grachev publicly demanded 
that Vorobyov resign from service, and he promptly handed in his letter of resignation. 
General Grachev also introduced the new commander of Russian forces in Chechnya --
Lieutenant General Anatoly K vashin from the General staff. 38 A new chief of staff of the 
Russian forces in Chechnya was appointed, Lieutenant General Leonty Shevtsov.39 
38 General Kvashin was promoted to Colonel General for taking Grozny and became commander of the 
NCMD in the spring of I 995. 
39 Shevtzov also got his third general's star after the Russian army overpowered the Chechen fighters and 
finally captured Grozny. In October 1995 he was tentatively appointed commander of Russian troops in the 
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I spoke with Vorobyov the day after he submitted his resignation. He told me that he 
received a number of phone calls of support from leading Russian generals, although many 
also called "to express their regret" that he had taken such a foolish step. However, in 
both cases he said that his personal fate is not as important as the fate of the country and 
of the army, which is being decided in Chechnya. In the fall of 1995 retired General 
Vorobyov decided to run for parliament, sharing the party ticket with Egor Gaydar and 
Sergei Kovalev, who played the most prominent roles in opposing the war. 
Vorobyov's resignation was a sign of the growing dissent among Russia's military 
chiefs. In December 1995 Grachev decided to dismiss three deputy defense ministers, 
Boris Gromov, Valery Mironov and Georgy Kondratyev, who were accused of dissension 
over the Chechen campaign. Several months later one more open military critic of the 
Chechen war, General Aleksandr Lebed, was also dismissed from service. 
Meanwhile on the battlefields of Chechnya, Grachev's wrath and verbal assault on the 
Russian officers, of which he's a first class expert, did make a difference. The Russian 
troop commanders acted more energetically and began to close in on Grozny. In the north 
the Russians took Pervomayskoe, Tolstoy-Urt and then Grozny's civilian airport, 
Groznoe-Severnoe. The Chechen fighters resisted but were outgunned and 
outmaneuvered by the better armed and better disciplined regular troops. The Chechens 
had some tanks but no self-propelled heavy howitzers. Their better motivated fighters 
answered to orders coming only from their immediate field commander (often a tribal 
warlord), which made regular staff work for the Chechen general staff chief Asian 
Maskhadov a nightmare. 
When fighting in the open, the Chechens were basically no match for the Russians. In 
a surprise south-east dash from Tolstoy-Urt, a column of Russian troops, led by 
elements of the 1 04th airborne division, captured the former Soviet military base and 
airstrip at Hankala at the eastern outskirts of Grozny, also overtaking the main Rostov-
Baku highway and cutting direct access into Grozny from Argun. This loss was so 
important that the Chechens even counterattacked from Grozny and Argun, using tanks, 
but were beaten back. 
Meanwhile the Western army group used the fighting to the north of Grozny and near 
Hankala to finally press its advance up to the city's outskirts. As a result, Grozny was 
surrounded on three fronts, leaving the south as the only clear outlet for the Chechens. A 
Russian General Staff officer said that this free corridor is to let the Chechens flee 
Grozny, but basically the Russian army simply did not have sufficient manpower to 
close it. 
For the last days of 1994 the fighting died down. Both sides were preparing for the 
decisive Battle of Grozny. 
The Battle of Grozny, January and February, 1995 
Bosnia peacekeeping force and sent to NATO headquarters to plan the Bosnia peacekeeping operation with 
NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, U.S. General George Joulwan. 
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General Grachev was in overall charge of planning the attack on Grozny that began on 
December 31, 1994, and led to heavy Russian army losses and a nearly complete 
breakdown of morale.40 Many officers in Chechnya confessed to me in mid-January 1995 
that at the beginning of that month the Russian army was on the verge of refusing to obey 
the ridiculous orders of its commanders and the government. 
On paper, the plan for taking Grozny seemed ideal and corresponded perfectly with 
the Prussian traditions of the Academy of the General Staff, Russia's premier military 
school. Four columns were to move in a sudden and coordinated attack on Grozny on 
New Year's eve and, having smashed the enemy, they were to meet at the Presidential 
Palace in center of town. The key to the plan, though, was that all four columns-- Army 
groups West, East, North and the Main Assault Force-- had to act and reach the center of 
the city simultaneously. 
The Russian forces assembled near Grozny numbered 38,000 men, armed with 230 
tanks, 454 ACVs, and 388 guns and mortars. The enemy forces were estimated by 
military intelligence at up to 15,000 men, 50 tanks, 100 ACVs, 60 guns and mortars, and 
30 B-21 Grad MRLs.41 The overall balance of forces obviously seemed to favor the 
Russians. 
However, today's Russian Army bears little resemblance to the old Prussian Army. 
The Main Assault Force managed to break into the center of Grozny, but the eastern and 
western groups barely moved at all. As a result, the enemy was able to concentrate 
almost all its forces against the Main Assault Force and smash it. General Lev Rokhlin's 
8th Corps reached the city center from the north but was unable to save the units that had 
fallen into the trap because of stiff resistance. The weather was bad and air support was 
inaccurate and ineffective. 
The Chechens did not mount a perimeter defense of the city. Instead, they cut off the 
ungainly Russian armored columns and attacked them from the rear as they moved 
through the streets of Grozny. "On January 2," a high-ranking Russian General Staff 
officer later admitted, "we lost contact with our forward units." These were the 131 st 
motorized-rifle brigade that took the city's railroad terminal and the 81st motorized-rifle 
regiment that reached the Presidential Palace, both from the Main Assault Force. 
On January 21, 1995 at the Sunzha front in central Grozny near the Presidential 
Palace, General Lev Rokhlin, commander of the North group, told me that General 
Anatoly K vashin, commander of Russian forces in Chechnya, was in charge of the Main 
Assault Force. 
General K vashin in January 1995 in Grozny told me that he had been deceived by the 
commanders of groups East and West. He said that they told him they were advancing 
when in reality they were holding their positions. 
40The official toll, as reported to the General Staff, was over a hundred servicemen dead a day in the 
beginning of January I 995. 
41 Grachev's official statement at February 28, I 995, Chechen operation assessment meeting in the Defense 
Ministry in Moscow. Nezavisimaya Gaze/a, March I, p.l. 
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Consequently, three high-ranking generals were removed from command in the 
western group. Major General Petruk - commander of the 19th motorized-rifle, also in 
overall command of group West- was accused of failing to support the 131 st motorized-
rifle brigade at the city's railroad terminal. The brigade was smashed, its commander 
killed. Petruk was replaced by Major General Ivan Babichev, commander of the 76th 
airborne division. 
Major General Nikolai Staskov, deputy Airborne Forces Commander-in-Chief and 
commander of group East, and Major General Vadim Orlov, commander of the 104th 
airborne division, were accused of cowardice. The 104th did not move when the 129th 
motorized-rifle regiment from the Leningrad military district moved in to Grozny from 
the Hankala base on December 31, 1994. Subsequently, the 129th was beaten and 
retreated on January 1, 1995, without accomplishing its mission. However, officers and 
men from the 104th told me in mid January in Chechnya that their commander saved 
them by not ordering them to advance into Grozny, where they in their light tanks, 
protected by aluminum armor, would have been massacred. 
One obviously does not need airborne units with their specially designed light 
equipment and special paratroops training when storming a big modern city with concrete 
buildings that can be turned into fortresses by a determined and highly motivated enemy. 
Well-trained and heavily armed infantry led by professionally trained officers are 
necesary, since in street fighting infantry platoon and company commanders, in close 
coordination with heavy howitzer and mortar units, determine the outcome of the fray. 
The last thing needed are lightly armored airborne tanks. 
The paratroopers were used in Grozny as crack infantry, but their fighting units had 
to be supplemented with Ground Forces artillery and tanks, as well as special flame-
thrower crews from the Chemical Forces. The same is true for the Interior Ministry 
troops and the Naval Infantry units. In the Interior Troops (Vnutrennie Voiska) many 
officers and men were more experienced in riot-control rather than in actual warfare. 
Some of the naval infantry officers were volunteers, who were taken off ships and sent 
into pitched street battles. The result of all these feverish improvisations was heavy 
losses of men and combat equipment after the initial plans for a parade-ground expedition 
went sour. 
However, the Russian Army overcame the shock of initial losses and defeats and won 
the battle of Grozny. The Russian Army has never had a tradition of unquestioning 
discipline and strict organization. Our army is better characterized as tenacious in 
defense, stubborn and capable of improvising in the most difficult situations. It was these 
qualities of Russian soldiers and officers that saved the army after the plans hatched by 
Grachev and K vashin fell apart. 
In the first week of January, Chechen sources repeatedly reported that several small 
groups of surrounded Russian soldiers remained in the center of the city and would soon 
have to surrender. In reality, Dudayev's main force at that time was engaged in 
counterattacks against General Rokhlin's army group (the 8th corps from Volgograd), 
trying to drive it from the city. If Rokhlin's small force, about five thousand men, had 
been thrown back, Dudayev would have been able to declare a complete victory. 
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However, Rokhlin rallied his troops, and some men who, after splintering away from 
units routed during the first attack on Grozny, joined his force. His men, using 
"Stalingrad tactics," moved to street fighting, creating several strongholds in concrete 
buildings from which they were able to fend off Chechen counterattacks. Talking with me 
in Grozny in January, Rokhlin emphasized several times the Stalingrad tradition of his 
regiments, partly because the home base of his corps is located in Volgograd, formerly 
Stalingrad. 
Rokhlin is a pitiless battle-happy George Patton/ Ariel Sharon type of a general. He 
was clearly not lost in Clausewitz's "fog of war" as many other Russian commanders 
were. His officers are accustomed to fulfilling any order from their commander without 
hesitation. Even though his wife and son were ill and he himself had severe throat 
problems during the battle of Grozny and could barely speak, Rokhlin refused to leave for 
treatment before the capture of the city. Having beaten back the Chechen counterattacks, 
Rokhlin's force went on the offensive, destroying the enemy and the city in their path, 
and took Dudayev' s Presidential Palace - the main Chechen stronghold in town - a big 
concrete building with a nuclear bunker in its basement. 
Rokhlin's offensive was enhanced by reinforcements rushed into battle by the General 
Staff. The most effective seemed to be the naval infantry units, the 165th naval infantry 
regiment from the Pacific Fleet and two battalions from the Baltic and Northern Fleets. 
The naval infantry entered the battle for Grozny in mid-January. During the campaign, 
their units were used as crack infantry at the most crucial positions along the front. On 
January 20, the soldiers of the 876th Northern Fleet assault battalion on their own 
initiative hoisted the Russian naval St. Andrew's flag above the entrance of DHdayev's 
presidential palace (higher than the official Russian National one!). 
Group East was disbanded in early January and its troops subordinated to General 
Rokhlin's group North. The forces of the Main Assault Force that survived the New 
Year's massacre were also subordinated to Rokhlin. 
As Rokhlin's group North pressed in from the north, group West under General 
Babichev stormed in from the south, using heavy artillery fire to smash the Chechen 
defenses and long-distance Shmel flame-throwers to destroy snipers. On January 21, 
1995 the two groups linked up in the center of town. 
The Chechens still occupied the south-east half of Grozny and established a new 
front line on the Sunzha river that divides the city. After several days spent regrouping 
and resupplying their forces, army groups North and West began a final assault on 
Grozny. Bridgeheads were established on the other side of the Sunzha. The Chechen 
fighters resisted with fierce counterattacks, mortar and sniper fire. 
But simultaneously with the head-on assault, the Russian forces began an operation to 
encircle the south-east half of Grozny. New reinforcements allowed the Russians to form 
a new South-East group, including the 506th motorized-rifle regiment ofthe 27th division, 
which sent a contingent of men to joint U.S.-Russian maneuvers in Kansas in October 
1995. This group moved in early February to block the last Chechen-controlled road into 
Grozny. 
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Assaulted from all sides and virtually surrounded, the Chechens fighters had to 
evacuate Grozny. By February 5, 1995, the bloodiest battle of the Chechen war was 
over. This Russian success was assisted by strategic deception. The Chechens were fed 
"secret" information (also using Moscow newspapers) to the effect that the main Russian 
strike would come at Argun, Shali and Gudermes, rather than in the south-eastern half of 
Grozny, and that the South-East task force had been created to carry out the attack. So 
the Chechens reinforced their positions in Shali, Argun and Gudermes at the very moment 
when Russian forces were beginning their final assault on Grozny. 
Grozny, where about 40 percent of the Chechen republic's population lived before the 
war, has been decimated and no one can tell when it will be rebuilt. The Chechen 
economy -- which for three years of semi-independence has been based on bank fraud, 
illegal export of Russian oil, large-scale smuggling and illegal weapons trade -- also lies in 
rums. 
Fighting In The Hills And On The Plains, March and April, 1995 
Suddenly after the Battle of Grozny, heavy fighting in Chechnya came to a halt and a 
tentative cease-fire was signed. Moscow also replaced General Anatoly K vashin as 
commander of the joint federal force in Chechnya with Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov, 
the commander of the Russian Interior Ministry's forces. 
In mid February, 1995 General Kulikov met with a Chechen military delegation 
headed by Asian Maskhadov, the chief of the Chechen general staff. These were the first 
serious negotiations since the beginning of the war. The lull in the fighting was politically 
motivated so that President Boris Yeltsin could appear with a "State of the Nation" 
address before a joint session of parliament in mid February, firmly stating that the 
military confrontation in Chechnya was over and that negotiations had begun. 
Naturally, the ultimate goal of the government's Chechnya policy remained 
unchanged: to liquidate Dudayev's army and to return Chechnya to the Russian 
Federation. But the troops needed a break after two months of sustained fighting. 
The Chechens established a new front on the Argun river, defending the towns of 
Gudermes, Argun and Shali. The Russian generals decided to wait until spring while 
regrouping and resupplying their forces. Spring meant more clear days and greater 
opportunity to exploit Russia's air power. In the meantime, the Russian Army would 
have time to pinpoint the Chechen positions and strongholds. 
Also the army generals wanted to pass more of the responsibilities of fighting the 
Chechens to the Interior Ministry forces, which had participated minimally in the battle 
of Grozny and, as a result, lost only about 40 men in the first two months of the Chechen 
war, many times fewer than the army. The officers and generals of the Armed Forces 
resented being sent into battle with the Chechens while the forces of the Interior and 
Emergency Situations ministries remained in the rear counting their pay. With Kulikov 
the new commander of the united federal force in Chechnya, the MVD troops were 
obviously going to see more action. 
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At the end of March, 1995, the sky was bright as the regrouped Russian army 
(spearheaded by the 165th naval infantry regiment from the Pacific Fleet) crossed the 
Argun river, easily broke the Chechen front near Argun-city and moved on at Gudermes 
and Shali. Squadrons of armored Su-25 Frogfoot attack plans constantly and vigorously 
assaulted the Chechen forces, leaving them no possibility of fighting in the open in an 
organized manner as a regular army. 
The Chechens had virtually no effective anti-aircraft defense system - no radar 
stations, no medium-range SAMs. When the Chechens had expelled the Russian cadre 
units in 1992 they took their guns but not the more sophisticated radar or anti-aircraft 
equipment which they did not know how to use. 
At the beginning of the conflict, the Chechens had several hundred portable surface-
to-air, heat-seeking Igla missiles. However, they only managed to shoot down a couple of 
Russian Su-25 close-support jets and over a dozen army and MVD helicopters using 
machine-gun and ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" fire, besides damaging a number of other aircraft. 
The Soviet-made Igla has a built-in "identification of friend or foe radar interrogator" 
designed to prevent the loss of aircraft from friendly fire. During the fighting in Grozny, 
these "smart" weapons recognized Russian airplanes as friendly and could not be 
activated. It has been reported that the Chechens were never able to reprogram their 
missiles. 
The Chechen morale began to break. In Shali and Gudermes the local population 
asked the fighters to leave so the Russians would not ruin their towns as they did in 
Grozny. As a result, the army took these towns without a fight. 
In mid-April an MVD force operating on its own in south-west Chechnya cleare.d the 
major towns and villages of the Urus-Martan district mostly without a fight. Only in 
Samashki did the Interior Ministry 21st motorized-rifle brigade meet some resistance and 
suffer casualties. 
Intensified attacks from the air and from Russia's heavy weaponry forced the 
remainder of the Chechen independence fighters to flee to the mountains. Dzhokar 
Dudayev's forces were slowly turning into a small, militant extremist sect along the lines 
of the Kurdistan Workers' Party or the Basque separatist movement. 
Fighting In The Mountains (May-June, 1995) 
In February, Russian forces completed the capture of Grozny and the Chechen's 
"temporarily" moved their command center to the town of Shali. In April, the Russians 
took Shali and Dudayev's headquarters were transferred to the mountain village of Vedeno 
which, between 1845 and 1859, was the fortified stronghold and capital oflmam Shamil. 
In mid-May, after the cease-fire announced for the VE-Day summit with Bill Clinton 
in Moscow ended, the Russian army captured Vedeno after a pitched battle. The 
Chechen military commander Asian Maskhadov attempted to regroup his command in the 
mountain village of Shatoi but was taken a month later in mid-June. The Chechens were 
running out of capitals. 
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-The Russian Army founded the fortress town of Grozny in 1817. However, it was 
only in February 1859 that the Russian troops based there were able to overcome 
Chechen resistance, capture the fortifications they had constructed in the forests and the 
mountain canyons, capture Shamil's capital ofVedeno and then the imam himself, and so 
end the Caucasian war. 
In the current conflict, the Chechens also fortified and stubbornly defended their 
capital and other strongholds. But they were so badly outgunned by the Russians that 
they could only slow the Russian advance, not check it. After the Russian army captured 
Shatoi, the mountainous region of Chechnya was effectively divided into several isolated 
pockets of resistance. 
The Chechens were mistaken to think that the mountains would stop the advance of 
the Russian Army. Since Shamil's time, the Chechens have not fought in the mountains 
and are no better prepared for such fighting than the Russian forces are. It is impossible 
even to compare the battle readiness of the Chechens with that of the mountain Tajiks of 
Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley, who constantly fought with other Afghan tribes for 
decades before the Soviets arrived. Even then, the mujaheddin would most likely have 
lost the war if they had not been supplied with American Stinger missiles. The Chechens 
have no credible anti-aircraft defenses and Russian aircraft rule the skies with impunity. 
During the successful mountain campaign in May-June 1995, the Russian Army 
outmanned, outmaneuvered and outgunned the enemy. When taking Shali,42 the Russians 
sent an armored column43 up the Argun river canyon that got ambushed. A company 
stayed behind to engage the enemy near the ambush and to simulate an attempt of head on 
advancing. Their heavy artillery hammered the Chechen defenses while the rest of the 
column used other, less defended routes to get to Shatoi. 
At the same time, a paratroop battalion of the 7th airborne division was helicopter-
landed behind enemy lines to the east of Shatoi and took the mountain town encountering 
little resistance. The Chechens tried to regroup and counterattack, but with other Russian 
columns converging on Shatoi from different directions,44 they soon decided to break off 
the engagement and scatter in the hills. 
So, why then did the Russians perform so poorly in the early stages of the war? Why 
were small, poorly prepared, combined units sent into Chechnya in December, when the 
region is covered with dense fog that prevented Russia's air power from providing 
effective cover for its ground forces? 
In early December, experts in the administration advised Boris Y eltsin to impose a 
blockade on Chechnya and then to assemble and prepare several strong attack groups. 
The idea was that, if negotiations failed to produce results, Russia would attack in force in 
the spring, smothering the enemy from the onset with an overwhelming military 
superiority. However, the politicians in Moscow decided to send an unprepared army 
into battle to cover up the disastrous covert operation using the Chechen opposition to 
dislodge Dudayev. The Russian military will not forget this. 
42The same pattern of action was executed a month earlier in Vedeno. 
43 The 245 Guards motorized-rifle regiment of the 47th tank division. 
44The 324th motorized-rifle regiment and elements of the I 04th airborne. 
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Y eltsin also made one other serious public relations blunder: He never visited the men 
in Chechnya. Instead, he merely made a quick stop during his vacation in April in the 
North Caucasian towns of Nalchik and Kislovodsk. On April 10, I was in a Russian 
military field camp not far from the ravaged village of Samashki, when a report came that 
Yeltsin was conducting a helicopter sight-seeing tour a hundred miles to the west. The 
officers were openly outraged. "He should be here instead," they remarked. 
Despite the war, the military parade on May 9 in Moscow was entirely traditional 
with freshly painted tanks from divisions in the Moscow region, and even, right-angled 
columns ("boxes") of cadets from Moscow's military academies, all wearing new uniforms 
and freshly polished boots. Parade participants did include veterans of the war in 
Chechnya, but they did not stand out. The traditional Russian military parade made 
many onlookers believe that this still is a soulless military machine fully and 
unquestioningly faithful to whichever Kremlin boss is on the viewing stand. 
But in Grozny in April, less than a month before, I saw another kind of parade. Five 
companies of soldiers and officers had formed next to the Grozny-North airport terminal 
to welcome First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and then Interior Minister 
Viktor Yerin. Soskovets and Yerin gave several dozen decorations and medals to 
servicemen who had distinguished themselves in battles against the Chechens, and then 
the companies marched past them. Their lines were not very even and none of them had 
the same uniform. It was camouflage of different shades and colors, from black-grey to 
light green. Some were in peaked hats, others in red or black berets, or simply in knitted 
black round ski caps bearing the inscription "Italy." They were unshaven and the armored 
personnel carriers they departed on after the parade were dirty, but this was a combat, 
not a parade-ground army. 
Most of the generals, officers and soldiers whom I met in Chechnya thought that they 
had won this war and were proud of it. But President Boris Y eltsin, who sent them into 
battle unprepared in December 1994, has neither influence nor support in the army. Of 
course, only a fraction of the Russian Army is fighting in Chechnya. But they have been 
sent there from virtually every military district in the country, from Vladivostok to 
Kaliningrad. Eventually, they returned to their bases and told their stories to the rest of 
their comrades in arms. The attitudes of the army in Chechnya have now become the 
attitudes of all the Armed Forces. 
Preparation For Further Action 
In mid-June, 1995, all major military operations in Chechnya ceased. The Russian forces 
even partially withdrew from populated areas, in preparations for a change of tactics. 
Small outposts in villages are vulnerable. Chechen women can cut them off by rushing at 
and surrounding the Russian soldiers, knowing that they will not harm them. Such action 
allows Chechen fighters to penetrate the village and take Russian troops hostage. It is 
even possible that in some Chechen towns, the military authorities will tacitly allow a 
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return to the lawlessness of the 1991-1994 period so that local civilians could invite 
Russian forces to return. 
The cease-fire accord and military disengagement agreement signed on July 30 was not 
a capitulation or the beginning of Moscow's gradual recognition of an independent 
Chechnya. True, the Russians did allow the Chechen fighters who were trapped in the 
mountains to filter through Russian lines into the lowlands, but this by no means can be 
considered a unilateral concession. 
In order to control the upcoming elections, and even to simply collect food and 
money, the Chechen warlords must control the region's major population centers. But in 
the lowlands, major Chechen units are exposed and there is nowhere for them to hide from 
Russian air power, artillery and tanks. 
During the course of the June offensive, federal units advanced far into the Caucasus 
Mountains and, from the military point of view, there was little sense in advancing 
further. Neither the Russian Army nor the Interior Ministry has any special mountain 
troops. Advancing further would have been quite difficult, and supply lines would have 
become increasingly difficult to manage. Maintaining a coherent front line in mountainous 
conditions was also impossible and the Chechens would certainly have penetrated 
Russian lines anyway. Vindicated by the fighting around Shatoi and Vedeno, they might 
have been able to begin a guerilla campaign. 
However, the mountains of Chechnya form a relatively small region, about 100 
kilometers by 50 kilometers. Of course, the Chechens know these hills well, but the 
limited resources of the few mountain valleys make it unlikely that they would be able to 
long support a partisan army or even to sustain an aggressive and constant terrorist 
campaign without substantial help from abroad in the form of weapons, ammunition, 
supplies, medicine and money. Otherwise, a serious guerilla campaign will never even get 
started. 
In addition, some of Chechnya's mountain people do not support Dzhokar Dudayev 
and many who do are unwilling to risk having their villages become targets for Russian air 
strikes. In short, the Chechens, like the Kurds, also need bases abroad where the Russian 
air force cannot reach them. In the final analysis, it seems that it is up to foreign countries 
to determine whether or not there will be a guerrilla war in the Northern Caucasus. 
The West, of course, has condemned the fighting in Chechnya, but it is unlikely to 
begin secretly supplying weapons to the enemy as it did in Afghanistan. A strong and 
stable Russia is in everyone's interests. 
There seems no possibility of Chechen guerilla bases operating with impunity on 
Georgian or Armenian territory when Russia itself has military bases in these countries. 
The situation in Azerbaijan is less clear, although it seems unlikely that the cautious 
Geydar Aliyev would risk an open conflict with Russia or incursions by the Russian 
Army analogous to what we have seen recently between Turkey and Iraq. 
But from Russia's point of view, the most important question is Iran. Cooperation 
with Teheran could help mute Iranian support for Moslem guerrillas both in Tajikistan 
and in Chechnya. Clearly, t~e controversial nuclear reactor sale to Iran is not just a 
lucrative export contract for Russia. 
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Regardless of the peace negotiations, the Russian Army remains the dominant military 
force in the region. Russian forces have not relaxed and are ready to engage and rout any 
Chechen unit, especially since they still massively outman and outgun their opponents. 
In April, the Chechens retreated into the mountains because they had been defeated in the 
lowlands and in Grozny. But they were unable to resist for long from the mountains and 
their main strongholds there -- Vedeno, Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt -- were fairly quickly 
taken. In June, the Chechens began serious peace negotiations because they were no 
longer able to continue the war. Several months later, they are no match for the Russian 
Army. 
While the talks in Grozny continued, despite flare-ups in the fighting and various 
mutual protests, the Russian generals replaced exhausted units, concentrated some of their 
forces in major garrisons, and handed many check-points over to the MVD. They are still 
in a position to quickly block off and capture any Chechen town or village, especially in 
the lowlands. The Russians' main goal in Chechnya remains as before: to split the 
Chechen opposition into those who can be pacified and therefore deserve encouragement, 
and those who are unreconcilable and will continue to bear the full brunt of the Russian 
Army. 
While pressuring the "bad" Chechens, Moscow will simultaneously try to pursue 
dialogue and cooperation with the "good" Chechens, including some field commanders and 
maybe the Chechen Chief of Staff, Asian Maskhadov. There are other possible "good" 
Chechens to promote: former Communist Party Chief and Chechen strong-man Doku 
Zavgayev and even the former Speaker of the former Supreme Soviet Ruslan 
Khasbulatov. The Kremlin still has not fully decided who will run Chechnya after 
Dudayev, but it is actively looking for an appropriate candidate. 
Appointing A "Czar" 
At the end of August 1995, President Yeltsin's representative in Chechnya, Oleg Lobov, 
was given sweeping executive powers in the region. He can issues orders to any Russian 
troops or security agencies there, as well as to local civilian authorities. He now has the 
rank of first deputy prime minister, giving him the right to affirm official government 
orders without first securing the approval of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. In 
short, Lobov has been made virtually a czar or viceroy in Chechnya. At the same time, he 
retains his influential position as Security Council secretary. 
The appointment of a "czar" to coordinate Russian policy in Chechnya was long 
overdue. Since the fall of 1991, Russian policy toward Dzhokar Dudayev's regime has 
been extremely erratic. Negotiations alternated with forceful measures and back again 
without any discernible system. Everything depended upon which ambitious Moscow 
politician or influential Moscow agency had seized the initiative and taken up the 
challenge of solving the Chechen problem. 
The most important result of this has been the inept and bloody intervention in 
Chechnya. Even during the fighting, the government agencies involved -- including the 
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Defense and Interior ministries -- simply could not work together, which naturally 
increased the campaign's casualties. Commanders of Army and Interior Ministry units 
constantly quarreled with one another, and soldiers even shot at one another. Operatives 
ofthe Federal Security Service in Chechnya told me in April that they were reluctant to 
give intelligence information on the Chechen resistance to Interior Ministry officers, 
because "they don't do anything with it until after the Chechens have already figured out 
what we know and the information becomes worthless." 
This lack of coordination bolstered the Chechen resistance. Even when the situation 
seemed hopeless from the military point of view, the Chechens continued to fight because 
they did not believe that Moscow had really decided to stand up for its geostrategic 
interests in the Caucasus at any cost. The majority of Chechens supposed, and many 
still do, that they just need to hold on a little longer and conflicts among Russian officials 
will force Moscow to withdraw its forces and admit defeat. 
If a powerful coordinator of Kremlin policy in the North Caucasus had been 
appointed a year ago, many people would still be alive today. But the question remains: 
will Lobov be able to radically change the situation after such a long period of 
unsystematic, failed crisis management by various Russian officials and generals? 
People tell a lot of malicious stories about Lobov. For instance, former Russian 
Deputy Prime Minister Yevgeny Saburov told me that in the fall of 1991, when the 
country was on the threshold of great changes and it had to be decided what kind of 
economic reform to pursue, Lobov read an hour-long speech to a meeting of the Russian 
government on how to gather birch branches to feed starving cows on collective farms. 
Saburov said that that was the moment when he realized the government of then Prime 
Minister Ivan Silayev was doomed. 
Lobov has very little experience in defense, national security and foreign policy. 
Having no idea what to do with the Security Council when it was thrust upon him in the 
fall of 1993, Lobov was apparently happy to let deputy secretary Vladimir Rubanov -- a 
former KGB operative and an appointee of Lobov's predecessor, Air Force Marshal 
Evgeny Shaposhnikov -- implement his own organizational ideas. Rubanov headed the 
group of Security Council representatives that Lobov sent to Chechnya a couple of weeks 
ago. Later, Lobov himself went there, accompanied by General Valery Manilov, another 
deputy appointed by Shaposhnikov. 
Lobov is open to others' ideas and is capable of energetically working them out, 
although he is not always able to tell a good idea from a bad one. Therefore, the success 
or failure of his tenure in Chechnya will be largely determined by his advisers Rubanov 
and Manilov who, incidentally, also have no experience quelling secessionist rebellions. 
Still, the idea to hand over power in Grozny to Doku Zavgayev, an influential leader of 
Gendergnoy, one of the biggest Chechen clans, may be a step in the right direction. 
New elections will not help Dudayev. If there were presidential elections in 
Chechnya, he might well win. But the elections will be to a convention which will work 
out a new constitution for the republic. This national assembly will be made up of 
representatives of several violently opposed factions, including various field commanders 
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from the resistance, supporters of the pro-Moscow government and various local and 
tribal leaders. Dudayev will not be able to manipulate this assembly. 
In 1993, he was forced to disband the Chechen parliament which had been elected 
under his control. Since that time, his authority has only extended to Grozny and the 
surrounding area. No single leader can control all the Chechen tribes without economic, 
political and military support from Moscow. 
For the majority of Russia's ruling elite, an independent Chechnya is absolutely 
unacceptable because it contradicts Russia's long-term military, geopolitical and even 
economic interests. The Russian government wants Dudayev and his dream of an 
independent Chechnya dead. If Lobov and his aids fail, then a new viceroy will be 
appointed in Chechnya to try to keep the railroad and pipelines operational, to help the 
good guys, punish the bad and also to learn to distinguish between the two. 
* * * 
The number of people killed in the Chechen campaign is unknown. The official Defense 
Ministry reports put servicemen fatalities under 3000. The majority of officers 
(including brigade commanders) who fought in the campaign believe that this is an 
underestimation. 
However, overall military losses may be higher, but not grossly so. The main 
problem is to figure out the Chechen losses. No one even has an approximate estimation. 
Several tens of thousands is all one can hear. Who of them was a fighter and who a 
civilian is still less possible to assess. One thing is definite, while the conflict continues 
the toll will rise. 
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Chapter Four 
The War in Chechnya: 
Implications for Military Reform and Creation of 
Mobile Forces 
Dr. Col. Vitaly Shlykov (Ret.), formerly with the General Staff, currently a private 
consultant 
Mikhail Gorbachev spoke out about the necessity for immediate military reform as early 
as 1987 and even created a working group of experts to outline a reform program. 
From 1988 through August 1991 the issue ofmilitary reform appeared with ever-
increasing frequency on the Soviet national security agenda. Reform advocacy was 
undertaken by a coalition that included rank- and- file military officers, civilian defense 
analysts and representatives of the civilian population at large. 
The core issue of the reform that polarized the military institution was the system 
of personnel recruitment. Should the Soviet Army abandon the existing arrangement - a 
regular army staffed by career officers and soldiers recruited through mandatory 
conscription - and become a volunteer/ professional army? The question overshadowed 
all other aspects of military reform to the extent that the very words "military reform" 
became synonymous with the introduction of a volunteer I professional army. 
One of the first proposals for restructuring the armed forces appeared in 
November 1988 in the weekly Moscow News.45 Its author was Lieutenant Colonel 
Alexander Savinkin, a previously unknown former paratrooper who became instructor at 
the Philosophy Department of the Lenin Military- Political Academy.46 
Savinkin maintained that the process of change in the military sector had fallen 
behind the rapid reforms that were under way in Soviet society as a whole and that only 
an urgent military reform program could correct this deplorable situation. The Soviet 
army, Savinkin wrote, had to be organized into a "professional- militia" force, with a small 
core group of highly trained professionals and a network of local militia. This structure 
would be fully adequate to meet any security contingency and would be consistent with 
the new, strictly defensive Soviet military doctrine enunciated by Gorbachev in 1987. 
The debate about military reform progressed against the general background of 
political change in the Soviet Union, and in particular the 1989 electoral campaign to the 
new Soviet parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies. Both advocates and 
opponents of military reform ran in these elections, and the campaign provided a 
45 A.Savinkin, "What kind of armed forces do we need?" Moscow News, 
November 6, 1988, p. 6. 
46 Now the Military University of the Russian Armed Forces 
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convenient setting for bringing the debate before a wider audience. The reform- related 
proposals featured in candidates' platforms included plans for establishing territorial and 
ethnic units, reducing the term of compulsory military service, and rejecting 
extraterritorial principles of military conscription. 
The parliamentary elections gave the reform movement a much needed 
independent institutional base. A group of maverick junior and mid-level officers elected 
into parliament and now invulnerable to retribution from the Ministry of Defense because 
of their status as deputies started to advance the military reform agenda in the new 
legislature. 
In late winter 1990 a group of seventeen military deputies ranking from senior 
lieutenant to colonel made public its program for military reform, which became known as 
the "Project of the Seventeen." According to this program the main goal of reform was a 
gradual transition to a volunteer "professional army supported by a mobilization reserve 
on the territorial principle."47 The transition was to take four to five years to complete. 
The submission of this program for consideration by the Supreme Soviet's 
Committee on Defense and State Security launched the legislative process in the area of 
military reform. This event marked the end of the Soviet High Command's previously 
unchallenged monopoly on representation of the entire military institution. Senior 
officials of the Ministry of Defense were left with no choice but to begin formulating a 
competing program for military reform. 
In June 1990 the Ministry of Defense presented its first plan for military reform. 
According to this, the reform would take ten years to implement and would consist of the 
following three stages: 
1. Withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, their re-deployment and 
resettlement, reductions in military training institutions, and 
restructuring of the military- administrative system, all in the span of 
two years. 
2. More troop reductions and cuts in strategic forces, which would take 
another three to four years. 
3. Completion of troop cuts and resolution of social problems in the armed 
forces.48 
It is quite obvious that the proposed measures had little to do with military 
reform. The re- deployment and resettlement of troops from Eastern Europe, troop 
reductions and cuts in strategic forces prompted by external political developments, were 
simply being presented to the public as examples of real reform accomplishment. 
47 
"Proekt semnadtsati," Komsomolskaya pravda, February 2, 1990. 
48 D.Yazov, "Voyennaya reforma," Krasnaya Zvezda, June 3, 1990; Na s/uzhbe Otechestvu (In service to 
Fatherland) TV broadcast on June 24, 1990. 
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After August 19-21, 1991 the Soviet Union disappeared, the Soviet Army was 
tom to pieces and economic reforms got underway. But officially the Soviet Army 
continued to exist for several more months, and with it the task of reforming. 
At the end of August 1991 a special Committee for Military Reform assigned to 
the State Council of the USSR49 was established. Its chairman was Army General 
Konstantin Kobets, who from August 21 to August 24, 1991 was the first Russian 
Federation's Defense Minister. It soon became clear that the only reason for establishing 
the Committee for Military Reform was to find a sinecure for General Kobets after his 
job was abolished on August 24, 1991 and he didn't receive a senior position in the Soviet 
Ministry of Defense. 5° Under General Kobets the Committee for Military Reform didn't 
produce any documents concerning military reform and was abolished in July 1992 due to 
the extinction of the object of reform, the Soviet Army. 
On May 7, 1992 a new Russian Army was officially proclaimed and on May 18, 
1992 General Pavel Grachev was appointed the new Defense Minister of Russia. For a 
short time it looked as if a real reform of the old Soviet Army taken over by a new Russia 
drew closer. 
But then in July 1992 General Grachev made known his plan for military reform. 
Grachev suggested that the Russian Armed Forces be reformed in three stages over a 
period of six to eight years. 
During the first stage (to be completed in 1992 /93) it was planned "to set up a 
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; finalize the target numerical strength and 
structure of the Russian Armed Forces; determine a system to control them and establish 
the sequence and time- frame for their reform process; create a legal basis for their 
functioning, with due regard for the norms of international law and existing international 
agreements; and design a system of social guarantees for servicemen, members of their 
families and people discharged from military service. 
During the second stage (two to three years), it was planned to complete the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from other states; to proceed with the reduction in 
personnel, bringing the total strength of the armed forces down to 2.1 million by 1995; 
and to introduce a mixed manning system (conscripts plus professional soldiers). 
During the third stage (three to four years), withdrawal of all troops of the North-
Western Group, located in the Baltic states, will be completed, and the reductions in 
deployed materiel levels called for by existing international agreements will be fully 
implemented. Structural and organizational reforms will be introduced, and total 
numerical strength may be brought down to 1.5 million. 51 
According to General Grachev, "the implementation of this complex and diverse 
package of measures, which constitute a true military reform program, should ensure the 
49governed at the time by Mikhail Gorbachev, who remained the President of 
the USSR until December 1991 
50since Marshal of the Air Force Yevgeny Shaposhnikov was appointed as the 
new Minister of Defense of the USSR 
51 NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 38, No.2, 1993, p. 22. 
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creation of Russian Armed Forces of a fundamentally new quality. "52 I quote General 
Grachev verbatim to show that his reform plan was essentially a replica of the old 
Yazov's plan of 1990 described above. The only significant difference from Yazov's plan 
was the emphasis put by Grachev on the need for more mobile forces. 
General Grachev put it like this: 
"The building up of the armed forces must be carried out, in my view, with 
a particular regard for the requirements of the mobile defense concept. 
This presupposes the existence of small but powerful groups of forces, 
ready to immediate action wherever a real threat arises. In this context, it 
will be advisable to organize the armed forces along the following lines: 
• Constant readiness forces, capable of effectively influencing local 
conflicts; 
• Rapid deployment forces, to include airborne troops, marine infantry 
units, light motorized rifle troops, army aviation assets and all other 
necessary supporting and reinforcing means. These forces shall be 
backed by military transport assets for transfer to any region as quickly 
as possible to reinforce constant- readiness forces stationed there; 
• Strategic reserves, formed in peace- time and to be deployed only during a 
major crisis or in wartime (large- scale wars)."53 
After General Grachev's appointment as Minister of Defense, any serious and 
organized discussion of military reform stopped for more than two years. 
The military reformers of 1988- 1991 (the "Group of Seventeen" et al.), 
disillusioned by the appointment of a uniformed military officer to head the new Russian 
Ministry of Defense instead of a civilian (an idea they had been advocating all along), 
resigned in the majority from the ranks of the armed forces and gave up their drive for 
military reform as hopeless in the new situation. Their views were aptly expressed by 
Colonel (Ret.) Yury Deryugin, a former consultant at the Russian State Committee for 
Defense: "By appointing General Grachev as the new defense minister, the president for 
all practical purposes has buried military reform."54 
As for the official establishment, its representatives from time to time made 
optimistic statements to the effect that military reform was progressing according to plan. 
The speaker of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian 
parliament) Vladimir Shumeiko wrote in an appeal to the Duma for more money for the 
52 Ibid., p. 23. 
53 Ibid., pp. 21, 22. 
54 The newspaper 24, July 3, 1992. 
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Ministry of Defense in December 1994, that "military reform has been going on for two 
years."55 
As proof that military reform was progressing successfully, the officials in the 
executive and legislative branches were pointing to troop reductions and reallocations and 
even to a new uniform introduced into the armed forces. President Yeltsin's decree 
No. 1833, issued November 2, 1993, "On The Main Guidelines OfThe Military Doctrine 
Of The Russian Federation," a vague and misleading document, was officially presented 
as a great step forward in military reform, despite the fact that privately even high-
ranking generals referred to it as "toilet paper." 
"The Main Guidelines Of The Military Doctrine" was not the only useless but 
officially approved document designed to prove that military reform was moving on. 
Another was the so- called "Law on Defense," adopted in late 1992 and which still 
remains in force despite the fact that the new Constitution passed in the referendum of 
December 1993 contradicts it in many points. 56 
President Y eltsin himself was a picture of optimism. Speaking before the highest 
commanding generals in Moscow on November 14, 1994, he stated that the creation of 
the mobile forces is being completed, a new concept of the building up of the Armed 
Forces and other Russian troops is drawing to a close and that Pavel Grachev is the best 
defense minister of the past decade. 57 
The war in Chechnya, which exposed the many shortcomings of the Russian 
armed forces, shattered this optimism. 
This war, which began December 11, 1994, got off to a rocky start from the 
beginning. On the ground, inexperienced Russian troops were badly battered at the hands 
of the lightly armed Chechen guerrillas, especially in the failed New Year's Eve assault on 
the Chechen capital. Casualties were high and many young soldiers surrendered rather 
than fight. 
Officers and men balked, saying they did not understand why they were being 
sent to fight on Russian territory. Several high-ranking generals publicly denounced the 
war, including the first deputy commander- in- chief of the Ground Forces Colonel 
General E. Vorobyev, who resigned in protest. By early April 1995 the Russian Army 
had cashiered 557 officers who refused to fight in the war in Chechnya, and started 
criminal proceedings against 11 of them. 58 
All this brought the problem of military reform into focus again. 
In his annual address to the Russian parliament on February 16, 1995. President 
Yeltsin indicated that he considered the situation in the Armed Forces unsatisfactory and 
55 Krasnaya Zvezda, December 10, 1994. 
56The final draft of the new "Law on Defense" was approved by the Duma on 
October 25, 1995 and has yet to be passed by the Federal Council and signed by 
the President. 
57Segodnya, November 15, 1994. 
58 The Moscow Times, April 8, 1995. 
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said that urgent measures for reforming the Armed Forces and other troops will be a 
priority in 1995.59 
Speaking during an official ceremony on February 23, 1995, the "Day of the 
Defender of the Fatherland" (a new title for the annual Armed Forces holiday, the "Day 
of the Soviet Army and Navy"), President Yeltsin said that "the army is slowly beginning 
to get out of hand - the conflict in Chechnya convinced us once more that we are late 
with reform of the army. "60 
In his February annual address to lawmakers, Yeltsin promised to make a 
statement before parliament on military reform and assigned Security Council Secretary 
Oleg Lobov and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin the task of devising a plan for military 
reform. He also promised that a permanent presidential commission on military reform 
would be established this year. He pointed out that "military construction" (voyennoe 
stroitelstvo, a term broadly used in the Soviet and now Russian military language to 
encompass all activities of the state with regard to the armed forces - their manning, 
equipping, financing etc.) is not only the job of ministries and other institutions of the 
Russian Federation which possess armed formations," but that "military construction 
should be organized in the first place by the state."61 
The reaction ofthe Russian military towards Yeltsin's urging to speed up reform 
was lukewarm, if not completely rejecting. 
At the wreath-laying ceremony by the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, President 
Y eltsin expressed his dissatisfaction with the slow pace of military reform. Questioned 
by the journalists on his reaction immediately after, General Grachev answered non-
chalantly, "If there is money, there will be reform." 
The Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov62 expressed a 
similar attitude in a more careful way: 
"As far as the reform of the Armed Forces is concerned, I'd like to point 
out that we are actually late with it. There is only one cause for the slow 
pace of reform- the weakening of the country's economy .... Regrettably, 
we can speak about reforming and re-equipping the Armed Forces with 
the existing methods and volumes of their financing only very 
conditionally. "63 
The most direct reaction came from the Commander- in- Chief of the Airborne 
Forces Colpnel General Yevgeny Podkolzin, who said in an interview to the weekly 
Moskovskiye Novosti: "If we don't have the money to normally feed the soldiers and 
59Segodnya, August 18, 1995. 
60lbid. 
61 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Supplement No.2, April, 1995. 
62promoted to the rank of Army General on May 7, 1995 
63 Krasnaya Zvezda, May 6, I 995. 
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house the officers, all this talk about military reform is worthless. . . .If we had the same 
material basis as the Americans, we would not be talking today about any reform. "64 
The military also refused to accept accusations of poor performance in Chechnya. 
General Grachev stated that actually the casualties of the Russian forces in Chechnya had 
been less than planned. The only lesson he agreed to draw from the war in Chechnya was 
the following one, which he gave in the popular TV broadcast Itogi: "Everybody keeps 
saying- reform, reform. The (tank) T -72 has proved itself wonderfully in Chechnya. 
So we will be making reform on the basis ofT-72."65 
Colonel General Igor Rodionov, Chief of the General Staff Academy, firmly 
refuses to see the connection between the need for military reform and the war in 
Chechnya. He writes: 
"Recently there has been a lot of talk that the military conflict, or as it is 
often called in the press, the war in Chechnya is almost the main reason 
why military reform is called for. The combat readiness of the armed 
forces, the skills of their commanders are being measured on the basis of 
military operations, failures and mishaps in the Chechen conflict. There 
are attempts to adjust even the organizational and personnel structures of 
the armed forces of the future in such a way as to make them suitable to 
solving tasks analogous to those in Chechnya- type armed conflicts. Here 
we have an old illness: only that is frightening which frightens us now. 
From here comes the exaggeration of the dangers which are by far not the 
main ones. The Chechen tragedy no doubt has had its influence on the 
military construction processes. It sped up the understanding by both the 
political leadership and society of the need for reforming in the military 
realm of the country's activities. But the events in Chechnya are not the 
cause for military reform. It ought to be well understood by all those on 
whom the future defense of the country and its armed forces of the 
twenty-first century depend."66 
The Russian military leadership rejects the experiences of the Chechen war to the 
extent that it prohibited their inclusion in the study programs of the military academies 
and schools. According to the Ministry of Defense, this conflict is atypical because it is 
being waged on Russian territory. Instead, studies of the war in Afghanistan are being 
strengthened. 
In the absence of real military reform, Russian generals are naturally trying to 
solve the military's most pressing problems through whatever means available. The 
decision to increase the military draft is just one such means. 
64 Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 51, July 30 - August 6, 1995. 
65TV broadcast /togi, February 12, 1995. 
66 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Supplement No.2, April, 1995. 
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On April 7, 1995 the Duma passed a bill which alters the existing Law on Military 
Service in Russia. Deputies approved changes which extend the length of required 
military service from 18 months to 2 years from October 1, 1995 and act retroactively for 
those drafted in 1993- 1994. The bill also introduces universal conscription of young men 
graduating from institutes of higher learning. 
According to the new law, college graduates will have to spend a year in the armed 
forces after graduation regardless of whether or not they received reserve officer training 
in college, as many Russian students do. Before that, a college graduate with reserve 
training automatically became a reserve lieutenant. Now such a student will only receive 
the rank after serving for one year as a sergeant. 
The "operation" to change the existing law was conducted in the best Soviet 
military tradition- secretly and quickly. The Chief of the General Staff Colonel General 
Mikhail Kolesnikov had requested that the hearing be closed to the press because he said 
he would reveal top secret information to the Duma. Actually no such information was 
disclosed,67 but safe from prying TV cameras, all factions (including the liberal Yabloko, 
led by Grigory Yavlinsky) except one supported the bill after an impassioned speech by 
General Kolesnikov, who assured the deputies that the army was so understaffed that it 
was not ready for combat. 
The only faction which opposed the bill was the reformist Russia's Choice, led by 
Yegor Gaidar. It pointed out that in recent years there had been a general trend toward 
shorter terms of conscript service in the militaries of the most developed nations around 
the world, as well as the development of professional, contract- based armies. These 
trends are the result of the reduced threat of a global military confrontation and the 
increasingly high qualifications that young people bring with them into service. Gaidar's 
faction insisted that Russia should be following these trends as well. 
After the vote on the new conscription law, the influential newspaper Izvestia, 
which usually supports Russia's Choice, published an article titled "The Duma Buried 
Military Reform."68 Colonel General (Ret.) Eduard. Vorobyev, who runs as number four 
on Russia's Choice's electoral ticket, said in an interview to the newspaper Segodnya: 
"The increase in the duration of compulsory service, the conscription of 
the college students to serve as privates is abnormal, dictated by a sense of 
hopelessness. This is a step away from military reform."69 
President Yeltsin's acknowledgment in his February annual message to the 
parliament that military reform "was the business of the state, and military construction 
ought to be organized primarily by the state institutions"70 freed Russia's military 
67The transcript of the session was later published in the newspaper 
Moskovskii Komsomolets. 
68 /zvestia,Aprilll, 1995. 
69 Segodnya, October 27, 1995. 
70 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Supplement No.2, April, 1995. 
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leadership from the need to justify its passivity in advancing military reform. On the 
contrary, the military made an about face and started demanding from the country's 
leadership to be reformed from above, by the president, the legislature, and the 
government. 71 
The State Duma, in its turn, decided to cede to the president the responsibility of 
tackling military reform. The Duma Committee on Defense voted not to introduce for 
plenary discussion of the Duma seventeen new draft laws concerning defense and 
prepared by the Committee until President Y eltsin presents his proposals on military 
reform to the parliament, as promised in his annual message in February 1995. 
In Russia the Administration sees to it that the president's orders are executed and 
promises kept. So, the Administration (on Yeltsin's direct orders, as far as I know) 
decided to stage a super- conference on military reform. The conference, titled Military 
Reform in Russia, was scheduled to take place at the end of April and was to last three 
days. 
The list of speakers included all the top personalities in Russian politics. The 
conference was to be chaired by the Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei 
Filatov. Here are some names and the titles of the reports, taken from the agenda sent to 
the participants: 
• Oleg Soskovets (First Deputy Prime Minister). Military Reform In 
Russia And The Management Of The Defense Sphere. 
• Anatoly Chubais (First Deputy Prime Minister). The Market, Property 
And Power Institutions OfThe State. 
• Pavel Grachev (Minister ofDefense). The Reform Of The Armed Forces 
-The Present And The Perspective. 
• Andrei Kokoshin (First Deputy Minister of Defense). Military-
Technical Policy And The Mobilization Preparedness OfThe State. 
• Yuri Yarov (Deputy Prime Minister). Military Reform And Its Social 
Aspects. 
• Andrei Nikolayev (Director of the Federal Border Service). The State 
And The Development OfThe Federal Border Service. 
Besides plenary discussions the conference agenda included four panels on such 
different aspects of military reform as "The Military Doctrine Of The Russian Federation 
-Problems of Improvement," led by Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Colonel 
General V. Manilov; "The Economy In The Transitional Period And Military Reform," 
led by Economics Minister Y. Yasin; "Finances And Military Reform," led by Finance 
Minister V. Panskov; and others, altogether more than 40 reports. 
71 Colonel General Igor Rodionov, "In Russia and for Russia," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Supplement 
No.2, April, 1995; Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, "Military Reform is inevitable. Problems of the 
military security of the Russian Federation," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 27, 1995. 
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All in all it looked as if the problems of military reform were becoming a priority 
for Russia's political leadership, as promised by President Yeltsin in his February 
message to parliament . 
Overall responsibility for the preparation and organization of the conference was 
given to Major- General (Ret.) Alexander Vladimirov, a well- known reformer in the early 
1990s who for the last three years had headed the group analyzing the problems of the 
Armed Forces and the military- industrial complex in the Analytical Center of the 
Presidential Administration. 
Then, several days before the conference was to take place, Vladimirov was 
summoned into the office of Dmitry Rumyantsev, the Chief of Personnel in Yeltsin's 
Administration, and told without any explanation that he was fired and the conference 
canceled. 
Sergei Filatov, Chief of the Administration, when approached by Vladirnirov, told 
him that he had nothing against Vladimirov and the orders to fire him came from "high 
above him." 
To me it is obvious that Vladimirov (and to a certain extent Filatov, who is known 
as Gaidar's supporter) simply fell victim to the general resistance of the officials invited 
to speak at the conference to discuss such an abstruse subject as military reform, and to 
make fools of themselves before their colleagues. So it was probably not difficult for 
them to convince Yeltsin or, more likely, somebody close to him, like Yeltsin's security 
chief Korzhakov, to get rid of such an eager beaver as Vladimirov. 
Yeltsin apparently decided to take notice of the military's demand for more 
money as a precondition of any reform. Speaking at a cadets' graduation ceremony in 
Moscow on June 28, 1995, Yeltsin acknowledged that "a lack of resources was partly to 
blame for the slow pace of military reform, but it should now get moving." Y eltsin also 
pledged to stop cutting back on military spending. "In the 1996 budget we have laid 
down the principle that the allocation of resources for national defense must be preserved 
at the level of 1995," he said. 72 
This was, to my knowledge, the last time President Y eltsin mentioned military 
reform. Since July 1995 the phrase "military reform" has disappeared from the 
statements and speeches of Russian high officials. My guess is that the country's 
leadership decided not to openly discuss the subject of military reform, which drew such 
a hostile reaction from the military, which is plagued by poor financing and other 
problems. The Soviet policy of covering all major decisions concerning the military with 
a veil of secrecy seemed, apparently, a better proposition. 
According to some, in August 1995 President Y eltsin signed an executive order 
"On Military Construction" and made Prime Minister Chemomyrdin chairman of a 
special "State Commission on Military Construction," with the task of preparing a plan 
for development of the Russian Armed Forces and other troops until 2005. That was 
certainly not a very happy choice because the "power ministers" (defense, interior, 
security services, border guards, etc.) are not responsible to the Prime Minister, but 
72 The Moscow Times, June 29, 1995. 
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instead are under direct control of the President. Besides, Viktor Chernomyrdin has very 
few chances to survive as Prime Minister after the parliamentary elections on December 
17, 1995, if, of course, they actually take place. 
The War In Chechnya And The Mobile Forces 
The war in Chechnya made obvious the fact that Russia had failed to build up efficient 
mobile forces despite President Yeltsin's optimistic statement in November 1994 that the 
creation of mobile forces was drawing to a close. 
Although the official Russian military doctrine adopted by Yeltsin's decree of 
November 2, 1993 authorized the creation of special mobile forces, the structure of such a 
rapid deployment force was never officially approved. Nevertheless, the Russian 
military establishment has long been debating how to form mobile forces. 
The creation of special mobile forces that could be rapidly deployed in any part of 
Russia's extensive land borders has always been a favorite idea of Defense Minister Pavel 
Grachev, a paratroops commander in the Afghan war. He has been insisting on the 
creation of an autonomous operational command based on an airborne force with its own 
airlift. 
His opponents say that the creation of a new command is inefficient, and that the 
military simply cannot afford the expenses involved in securing the necessary aircraft. 
They suggest that a system of local mobile defense forces be created that would be fully 
staffed and equipped with all the equipment of a modem motorized rifle division. These 
units would cover military activity in their own theaters of operation, monitoring and 
preparing for intervention in local conflicts. 
There also exists a certain ideological, anti- Western undercurrent in these disputes. 
Colonel General Igor Rodionov writes, for example: "We should view more critically 
certain proposals on the part of proponents of pro- Western, pro- American orientation 
-reduction of the number of armed services to three, exaggeration of the role of mobile 
forces [emphasis mine- V. Sh.], separation of the Ministry of Defense from the General 
Staff, etc."73 
The war in Chechnya brought some of these differences into the open. 
Strangely enough, the greatest criticism of Grachev's concept of the mobile forces 
came from the Airborne Troops (VDV) themselves, who were supposed to be the core of 
the mobile forces. In an interview with the weekly Moskovskiye Novosti, the 
Commander- in- Chief of the VDV Colonel-General Y evgeny Podkolzin said, when 
questioned about the rumors that the paratroopers had performed poorly in Chechnya, 
that these rumors were being disseminated with one purpose only - to prepare the 
ground for an attempt to dissolve the paratroopers in other formations and create a mobile 
force on the basis of the VDV. 
73 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Supplement No.2 April, 1995. 
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He made several strong statements which deserve to be quoted verbatim. Asked 
whether or not he was opposed to the mobile forces he answered: 
"The mobile forces are necessary. I am all for it. But this project needs 
detailed calculations. We need a clear answer to the question: what are we 
going to gain and what to lose as a result of reform. Until I get a clear 
answer to this question I won't tolerate a disintegration of the VDV. 
Otherwise the defensive capability of the country will suffer an irreparable 
loss. 
" .. .1 don't understand the need for these experiments with the VDV. 
Our troops, who possess the best professional training comprise only 2 
percent of the strength of the Armed Forces and have been carrying the 
main combat burden since 1988. The five divisions of the VDV are still a 
real fighting force. If we continue to torture them with experiments the 
country might remain without combat ready units. "74 
Podkolzin complained that the airborne troops in Chechnya were subordinated to 
local commanders from other branches of the armed forces who didn't use them 
efficiently and who tried to blame the paratroopers for their own mistakes. He added that 
with one full- strength airborne division he would have disarmed Chechnya long ago 
without heavy bloodshed. 75 
On October 6, 1995 the newspaper Segodnya published a big article by Maria 
Dementyeva "From the Skies to the Ground. Russia's Airborne Troops Will Probably 
Cease to Exist." The author, quoting "competent sources," wrote that the Russian 
General Staff had prepared a document, already signed by Defense Minister General 
Grachev, which contains a new concept for the development of the airborne troops. 
According to the document, the VDV are to be reduced from the present five to two or 
three divisions (the USSR had seven airborne divisions). The existing airborne brigades 
are to be transferred to the military district commanders. 76 
Asked about the existence of such a document, Colonel Igor Kashin, spokesman 
for the VDV Commander- in- Chief Colonel General Y. Podkolzin, admitted that "there is 
a plan ... that stipulates reduction of VDV units" and that the plan to scrap the VDV is 
"one of several different conceptions of overall reforms in the national armed forces" 
currently being considered by top- brass analysts within the General Staff. So far, Kashin 
stressed, none of these conceptions has gathered the crucial support necessary among 
General Staff planners to be submitted for Defense Minister General Grachev's 
endorsement. 
As to the anonymous source at headquarters, quoted by Segodnya, Kashin called 
him into doubt. "We would have known if such a document had been signed," he said. 
74 Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 51, July 30 - August 6, 1995. 
75 Ibid. 
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Yet Kashin supported Segodnya 's criticism of the plan to cut back the Airborne 
Troops, which, in his opinion, remain the most capable branch of Russia's undermanned 
military. "We don't deserve such cutbacks; what we need is well-thought reform," said 
Kashin.77 
In his turn, when contacted by the press, Grachev's press service dismissed 
Segodnya 's report, reiterating the Defense Ministry's intention to base mobile forces on 
airborne divisions. "I see no reason why VDV should be cut," said Colonel Ivan Skrylnik, 
spokesman for the Defense Ministry. 78 
But still the argument goes on. For example, one of the senior experts at the 
Military Research Center of the United States and Canada Institute of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Konstantin Oznobischev, stated in an interview that such a drastic 
reduction is "quite possible." Oznobischev linked the plans to scrap airborne divisions to 
Grachev's reported dissatisfaction with VDV Commander- in- Chief Podkolzin, who had 
criticized the Defense Ministry's methods of campaigning in Chechnya. The Defense 
Ministry's strategists, according to Oznobischev, chose to push rebels out gradually 
while Podkolzin favored a blitzkrieg by airborne troops. "It could well happen that in the 
course of all these in-house intrigues a situation arises whereby personal likes and dislikes 
influence strategic decisions," said Oznobischev.79 
So far Grachev himself didn't openly express his opinion about the dispute. His 
last public statement about the mobile forces was made in September 1995 in 
Vladivostok, where he announced the beginning of the creation of mobile forces in the 
Russian Pacific Fleet. According to Grachev, the naval infantry division stationed in 
Vladivostok by the end of 1995 will include an assault battalion, representing the core of 
the Pacific Fleet mobile forces. The completion of the build- up of such forces, according 
to Grachev, is scheduled by year 2000. 
A Revival of Interest in Military Reform in Russia 
Despite an obvious unwillingness of the present Russian leadership to openly discuss 
military reform, it will hardly succeed in avoiding public debate on the subject. The 
reason is that military reform (or rather, its absence) is turning into one of the powerful 
weapons of the political opposition in its struggle for power. 
There is a veritable resurgence of public interest in military reform. 
On September 24, 1995 a new social- political movement "For Military Reform" 
has been launched. It is based on Russia's Choice and its affiliates. Among the founders 
of the new movement are Yegor Gaidar, Alexander N. Y akovlev (head of the state radio 
and television and former CPSU Politburo member), Colonel General (Ret.) Eduard 




Vorobyov and "The Military For Democracy" movement, umtmg mostly military 
reformers (all now retired) of the first "democratic" wave of 1988- 1991. 
Less than a month later, on October 15, 1995, another movement, called "Honor 
and Motherland" (Chest' i Rodina) was established with a proclaimed aim of advancing 
military reform. Its founders had all along wanted to call the movement "The Public 
Committee for Military Reform" but had to change the name to Honor and Motherland at 
the last moment to prevent confusion with Gaidar's movement. 
Honor and Motherland has been created under the aegis of Lieutenant General 
(Ret.) Aleksander Lebed's electoral bloc, the Congress of Russian Communities (CRC). 
The Congress of Russian Communities has gone from obscurity to prominence since 
General Lebed lent it his considerable charisma. Lebed himself is looked upon is one of 
the most serious contenders for the presidential seat next June and is now hard on the 
parliamentary campaign trail. 
The two new movements, For Military Reform and Honor and Motherland, attack 
the present government's policies on military reform from two opposite directions, 
aiming for different voting blocs. 
According to Gaidar, he rejects joining Chernomyrdin's electoral bloc, Our Home 
is Russia, for two reasons: first, the war in Chechnya, for which Gaidar blames the 
government, and second, military reform, which, Gaidar claims, the "government wants to 
replace by a re-militarization of society. "80 
Russia's Choice and the movement For Military Reform aim at that part of the 
electorate which is unhappy with heavy military expenditures and the lengthening of the 
conscription service. According to its electoral program, Russia's Choice understands the 
following to fall under military reform: 
• establishing civilian control over the Armed Forces; 
• introducing alternative military service, which would allow the conscripts 
to reject service in "hot spots" (areas of armed conflicts) or far from 
home in favor of the alternative service; 
• changing the structure and reducing the personnel strength of the Armed 
Forces; 
• giVmg up conscription in stages and introducing a voluntary military 
service.81 
Honor and Motherland 1s radically different in its approach both to military 
reform and to the voters. 
80 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May II, 1995. 
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Lebed's movement is geared at his most natural electoral constituency, the 
military, and he is not shy about exploiting the discontent in the army to bolster his own 
political ends. It is a shrewd move considering that servicemen constitute one of the most 
disciplined voting blocs in the country. Estimates of the military's strength in the 
electorate run as high as 20 million voters, if one counts active duty and retired 
servicemen, their spouses and workers in the military- industrial complex. 
In his one- hour long speech at the conference of Honor and Motherland, Lebed 
said that the present Russian army is "in a state of coma" and found the present situation 
"criminal," when soldiers live in "second- rate chicken coops" and are fed only once a 
day. 82 He pledged to remedy the situation and added that the army would hardly forgive 
the politicians responsible for the self- destroying reforms which caused the present state 
of affairs when Russia lost its military and international significance. 
According to Lebed, Russia as a state had survived in the past only because it 
"always began its reforms with the army" and "strengthened and prospered thanks to the 
presence of a soundly organized military might." He said he was sure that Russia's 
economic and political survival should begin with a "military revival." With "a good 
army," which, said Lebed, doesn't fight but through its sheer existence not only deters, 
but kills the whole idea of an aggression, Russia would be able "to complete reforms 
which were not completed from the time of Peter the Great, Alexander II and Stolypin."83 
In Lebed's words, Honor and Motherland will develop its own program of 
military reform and will see to it that it is carried out. 
The main expert on military reform in Honor and Motherland is Colonel General 
Igor Rodionov, Chief of the General Staff Academy, who made the main report on 
military reform at the conference. 
As a conclusion I'd like to stress, that one of the most significant results of the 
war in Chechnya is the serious change in the role of the military factor in the current 
balance of political forces in Russia. While earlier the army did everything possible to 
avoid being drawn into the political struggle, now we are seeing a markedly increased 
readiness of the army to enter the political fray. The military is actively seeking out 
political figures with whom they can cooperate. 
Lebed's Congress ofRussian Communities is not the only group that has tried to 
bring the powerful military bloc under its wing. It is difficult to find a major party that 
does not boast a general in its top lineup. Colonel General Boris Gromov, popular hero 
of the war in Afghanistan, heads his own party, My Fatherland; Lieutenant General Lev 
Rokhlin, who rose to prominence during the Chechnya conflict, is number three on the 
Our Home is Russia list; and so on. 
All this means that we'll hear a lot more about military reform in the months and 
years ahead, especially if Russia ends up with a general as its next leader. 
82 The Moscow Times, October 19, 1995. 
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Chapter Five 
The War In Chechnya And A Crisis Of Russian 
Statehood 
Vladimir P. Averchev 
Deputy of State Duma of Russia 
Introduction 
The war in Chechnya, a dramatic and even tragic event in recent Russian history, is by no 
means an isolated or unique outcome of the functioning of Russia's society and 
government. The most striking characteristic of the present state of affairs in Russia is a 
high degree of disintegration and mutual isolation of various components at societal, 
institutional, and organizational levels. 
The destroyed integrative mechanisms of the totalitarian state have not yet been 
replaced by the democratic feedback and coordinating systems in Russia. Instead, this 
gap is increasingly filled by substitutes like political myths and phantoms of different 
kinds. They are the myths in political and bureaucratic elites about value orientations and 
motivations of ordinary people and vice versa, widespread phantoms of a great empire 
that no longer exists but nonetheless exercises powerful influence on the attitudes and 
decisions of important elite groups. 
This inevitably produces widespread misperceptions, communication 
breakdowns, unintended outcomes, social and political anomies and crises of various 
kinds and magnitude. The war in Chechnya is a special case of such breakdowns in the 
sphere of national security policy making. 
National Security Policy 
National security policy making and implementation is a complex process that is focused 
on the President of Russia and involves numerous institutions branches of executive and 
legislative branches of government at the national and local levels. 
The rationality of this process depends on the degree of consensus reached among 
society in general, political elites, and branches of government regarding the national 
security interests and goals in a particular situation or in particular region of the country 
or the world. 
Its effectiveness (in terms of accuracy of assessments of a situation, adequacy of 
means chosen to reach the objectives, implementation control, etc.) depends on the state 
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of the government machinery - efficiency of decision making and implementation 
structures and procedures, coordinating mechanisms and the like. 
In the case of the war in Chechnya we are dealing with a breakdown of virtually all 
of these components. 
The Issue Of Consensus 
The Chechnya crisis has lasted for several years and to the fall of 1994 there had been a 
broad consensus in Russia regarding the goals of the governmental policy toward 
Chechnya. With the exception of a small minority, the Russian public and political elites 
agreed that the goals of preserving territorial integrity of Russia and securing its 
geopolitical interests in Transcaucasian region are of such importance that they justify use 
a wide spectrum of political and economic pressures to reintegrate Chechnya into 
constitutional, political, and economic structures of Russia. 
But Russia turned out to become deeply divided regarding the means chosen by 
the President to reach these objectives. Public opinion, major political parties, legislature 
and even part of government have been against the use of armed forces or at least against 
the particular way they were being used in Chechnya. This division embraces the whole 
range of issues beginning from more technical ones that divided Russian military 
establishment and to the fundamental constitutional and ideological issues like limits of 
legitimate use of force, parliamentary control over the executive, precedence of individual 
human rights over interests of state, the right of an ethnic group to a territory of its own, 
etc. 
These divisions in themselves were not the outcome of one particular decision by 
the President but in fact preceded his decision to use military force in Chechnya. They 
existed implicitly or explicitly as a side effect of the breakdowns in the subsystems of 
Russian society and government mentioned above and made this fatal decision possible 
and even inevitable. 
The President and Civil Society 
The constitution that granted the President vast, practically authoritarian powers led 
during 1994 to a growing isolation of his office from the rest of society. All attempts of 
Yeltsin's entourage to create feedback loops and communication mechanisms and 
eventually to secure popular support for him without the help of political parties were 
inconsistent and eventually failed (the Treaty on National Accord, the Presidential 
Council, the President's Public Chamber, etc.). The general public felt an increasing sense 
of alienation and helplessness in the face of government bureaucracy, to even a greater 
degree than under communist regime. 
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On the Presidential side we witnessed the formation of myths about the mood and 
expectations of society. In particular, the idea that a decisive use of force in Chechnya 
would appeal to the Russian public and would help to restore the President's popularity 
was widely cited as one of the main motives of his decision. Even more, after the initial 
failure of a military "quick solution" to the Chechnya problem, the President could 
proceed along the same road despite active protests and widespread passive rejection of 
his policy. 
The President And The Parliament 
The Constitution had the same institutional effect on the relationship between the 
President and the parliament in the case of the war in Chechnya. From the very beginning 
both the State Duma and Council of Federation opposed the brutal use of force in 
Chechnya. However, the absence of an effective balance of power in the Constitution did 
not allow the parliament to check presidential decisions and ensuing governmental actions. 
The Council of Federation was unable to exercise its authority to approve or 
disapprove the introduction of the emergency rule in Chechnya and hence the use of force 
inside the country because the President simply did not ask for the council to have a role. 
Later it even lost its case against the President in the Constitutional Court, which ruled 
that the President did not violate the Constitution by issuing an executive decree to 
disarm "illegal" armed "gangs" without specifying the methods to be used to fulfill this 
goal. This case highlighted the existence of the vast "gray zones" in Russian laws that 
regulate the use of armed force and which were skillfully used by the government to avoid 
parliamentary control. 
The majority of factions and groups in the State Duma also condemned the 
President for the launching the war in Chechnya, but the Duma failed to exercise its 
limited powers of control over the government. 
First, there were several attempts to pass a law that forbade the use of armed 
forces in Chechnya or, more generally, to stipulate the use of force by a requirement to 
pass a special law in each particular case. The Duma failed to create a legal basis for its 
control over the government due to various political reasons. But the main obstacles are 
the above-metioned constitutional provisions granting vast powers to the President. 
Second, budgetary control- the only potentially effective instrument of Duma's 
influence over the executive branch- has also proved to be useless in this particular case. 
The beginning of the Chechen operation coincided with the final stage of the budget 
consideration in the parliament. Several factions tried to stop the war by banning any 
additional appropriations for the military operations. But the government argued that the 
limited operation in Chechnya, both in terms of scale and duration, could be implemented 
without any additional funding above the already agreed upon appropriations for the 
"power" ministries. Later on, when the grave miscalculations by the government of the 
costs of the war in Chechnya became obvious, the situation of the government was saved 
by inflation, which turned out to be much higher than the projection used for the 
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budgetary calculations. As a result, the government accumulated large non-allocated funds • 
which it could use at its own discretion, since the law also does not contain provisions for 
such a situation. 
Third, the State Duma created a special investigative commission to look into the 
roots, causes, and consequences of the Chechnya crisis. But since the Constitution does 
not provide control powers to the Duma outside the budget control, the activities of this 
commission from the very beginning were little more than an exercise in public relations. 
Nonetheless, it served its role as a standing public forum for discussion and clarifications 
of positions of various groups toward the war in Chechnya. 
On the positive side, the lessons from the Chechnya crisis have given strong 
impetus to the legislative process to close loopholes in the laws that regulate national 
security matters. 
The President And The Government 
The war in Chechnya has dramatically highlighted serious flaws and breakdowns in the 
architecture and functioning of the administrative machinery ofthe Russian government in 
the matters of national security policy making and implementation. 
Formally, the President is the focal point of an elaborate network of units and 
positions intended to provide information support and coordination for making and 
implementing major security decisions. It includes the Security Council, the National 
Security Assistant, the President's Administration, various intelligence agencies, etc. 
In practice, this network lacks clarity in terms of authority, subordination, and 
procedural coordination. Thus, the Security Council, a constitutional body, still does not 
have a law that would define its status and authority. The accounts of the Council's 
meeting where the decision to launch the Chechnya operation was made show its inability 




A brief analysis presented here shows that the most pressing problems in the nationa~ 
security policy sphere in Russia lie not so much in the substantial as in the institutionaU 
organizational, and procedural aspects of functioning of the Russian state. Withou~ 
fundamental changes in these areas, crises will be inevitably repeated in domestic as well 
as international security matters by institutional and organizational failures. 
It is not a coincidence that the re-establishment of internal cohesiveness and the 
integration mechanisms of Russian society and state have become core issues of politica~ 
debates and the election campaign for parliament in 1995. 
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